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There is a lack of attention to the aftermath of a deployed cyber weapon: There is no 
mechanism for the assignment of accountability for the restoration of affected 
infrastructure and remediation of violation of established laws of war after cyberattacks 
occur.  This study analyzes International Humanitarian Law and international treaties as 
they apply to the cyber post-conflict period and explores current jus post bellum 
frameworks, which can be used to design a cyber-warfare jus post bellum framework.  It 
also analyzes analogies to traditional warfare in the damage assessment and aid provided 
during the recovery period of the 1998 Kosovo and the 2003 Iraq Wars.  It also discusses 
the available international cyber organizations. As an example, the study analyzes 
responses to cyberattacks in a case study involving South Korea and North Korea. 
Additionally, this study examines the related issues of the effects of deploying a 
cyber-weapon, the ways to establish acceptable levels of attribution, the challenges of 
cyber-damage assessments, and the ability to contain and reverse cyberattacks. This 
thesis proposes a cyber-warfare jus post bellum framework, with emphasis on prevention 
and cyber weapons control, proposes cyberattack relief-effort actions, and offers a post-
cyberattack cost checklist. 
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Certain it is that a great responsibility rests upon the statesmen of all 
nations, not only to fulfill the promises for reduction in armaments, but to 
maintain the confidence of the people of the world in the hope of an 
enduring peace. (Kellogg, 1929) 
States are developing cyber weapons. Cyber weapons can target systems 
anywhere around the world because we have a global interconnected network. 
Industrialized and developing states dependence on cyberspace and the Internet have 
turned these tools into “global commons” (Giesen, 2013); however, these tools also 
provide the conduits for attacks. Any state can target the military organizations of other 
states through cyberspace and from their operations centers. Considering the Internet’s 
interconnectedness, these cyberattacks can also produce significant destruction (Giesen, 
2013) which could even result in loss of life as a secondary effect. 
Not only government organizations use cyberspace; the private sector, civilians, 
and academia employ the same resources that cyberspace provides such as the power 
grid. Therefore, cyberattacks can cause civilian entities to end up being collateral 
damage. The damage cyber weapons can cause these various organizations can be just as 
dangerous and costly as kinetic weapons. Consequently, when actors in cyberspace 
deploy cyber weapons, they should also bear the responsibility of support during the 
affected infrastructure’s restoring and rebuilding phases. This transition phase is known 
as jus post bellum or justice after war. There needs to be planning for the aftermath of 
cyberattacks in addition to controlling proliferation of cyber weapons. This is especially 
important when state and non-state actors continue to deploy more sophisticated 
cyberattacks with no accountability, such as Stuxnet (2010) (Zetter, 2011), the 
cyberattacks against Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008) (Kaska, Talihärm, & Tikk, 2010), 
and South Korea (2013) (Sang-ho, 2014a). These attacks had no direct financial-gain 
intentions, but were intended to destroy or disrupt the selected targets, and were possibly 
conducted or at least sponsored by state actors. 
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A. CYBER WARFARE: JUS POST BELLUM FRAMEWORK 
DEVELOPMENT JUSTIFICATION 
States enter into agreements and treaties to ensure adherence to established laws 
of war, aid the safety of their citizens, and provide humane treatment for their warfighters 
during armed conflict. As the international community develops new weapons, it also 
proposes and enters into new agreements such as those on the development and use of 
nuclear weapons. With the emergence of cyber weaponry and the risk cyberattacks pose 
to civilian populations, the international community needs to use the same international-
agreement paradigm to control cyber-weapon development and ensure ethical conduct 
during and after cyberwars. 
States are supposed to plan for jus post bellum activities when they enter into an 
armed conflict. However, even with adequate planning, states underestimate the scope of 
the post-conflict actions, which results in failed attempts to conduct proper post bellum 
activities. For example, the United States government expected a swift transition during 
the 2003 Iraq War, with a fast military departure after they established the new 
government; this was not the case and it showed the lack of consideration for post bellum 
activities (McCready, 2009). During an armed conflict, militaries’ main objective is to 
win wars; therefore, they often misjudge stability operations and believe that, once the 
fighting concludes, the stability operations will be easy to accomplish. For instance, 
previous wars degraded Iraq’s infrastructure; the 2003 Iraq War caused further 
destruction to food, water, security, and sanitation infrastructures, which considerably 
increased death rates (Burnham, Doocy, Dzeng, Lafta, & Roberts, 2006). This made post 
bellum actions harder to accomplish and greatly affected the ability to save lives and 
quickly reconstruct infrastructure. Orend (2007) believes that there is great uncertainty as 
to whether or not Iraq is better than it was before the 2003 war. This could be true since 
they are currently facing an occupation by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 
ISIL took advantage of the void the United States and its coalition partners left before 
Iraq’s full war recovery. If we cannot correct the situation with kinetic operations that 
have plethora of historical learning lessons, it will be even more difficult to get it right in 
cyberspace and to properly deal with the aftermath of cyberwars. There are still many 
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uncertainties when releasing cyber weapons, and decision makers have limited 
understanding of the technology and ability to determine what the collateral damage will 
be. 
Some weapons continue to cause harm many years after a war has ended. For 
example, minefields are still hurting local populations because they are either never 
removed or their locations are unknown (U.S. Department of State, 1994). States may 
need to deal with these types of issues for many years. The implications of releasing a 
computer virus have some similarities since a virus can continue to affect systems even 
after the conflict has ended, and it encounters many victims on its path that might not 
have the capabilities to respond. For instance, the Stuxnet worm, one of the most precise 
cyber-weapon released to date, targeted the Natanz facility (Zetter, 2011) and had direct 
collateral damage on many civilian machines as well as the indirect damage caused as a 
result of criminals using the source code to create virus variations for their own crimes 
(Lin, Allhoff, & Rowe, 2012). The damage might not equate to loss of human life; 
nonetheless, when a virus is involved, it affects many systems within seconds and may 
require millions of dollars to assess the damage and fix the problem. The cost depends on 
the number of affected systems, the labor hours required, and the required level of 
technical knowledge of those involved in the effort. A computer virus deployment thus 
raises ethical issues concerning state and non-state actors, whether attacks adhere to the 
laws of war, assessment of the cost to public and private organizations, and attribution.  
States and the international community have established laws to deal with cyber 
crime, but what happens when these cyberattacks are not of a criminal nature? How do 
states and the international community deal with this emerging threat? The international 
community has not come to a consensus about what constitutes an act of war in 
cyberspace. They have given even less thought to what should happen after cyber 
conflict. This study analyzes International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and international 
treaties as they apply to after cyber conflict, explores current jus post bellum frameworks, 
analyzes the aid provided during the recovery period during two kinetic wars, and 
discusses the available international cyber organizations. All these concepts are used as a 
basis to design a cyber-warfare jus post bellum framework. 
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B. THESIS PURPOSE 
Vint Cerf stated in 2011, “the Internet is brittle and fragile and too easy to take 
down” (cited in Karlgaard, 2011). What he means is that any malicious actor with a 
connection to the Internet has the ability to cause harm in cyberspace. Many cyber 
systems such as industrial control systems are vulnerable because security was not a 
priority in the design process. One example is the Aurora vulnerability, which targets a 
sequence of electrical breakers to get them out of synchronization, which can make a 
system break down and cause physical damage; this vulnerability is still present today in 
many control systems (Zeller, 2011). States and non-state actors can target electrical 
systems from far away as the electric and other control systems continue to move their 
access to the Internet. States will continue to need cyber protection from aggressors and 
ensured justice. 
The international community can seek to learn from previous examples and 
researchers’ jus post bellum concepts to start the discussion on what a just peace looks 
like in dealing with cyber post-conflict. There are good examples of post bellum actions 
such as for World War II (WWII) where there was a positive outcome by fully 
considering post-conflict actions (McCready, 2009). The United States began post 
conflict planning during WWII almost at the beginning of the war and continued 
planning until the end of the war (McCredy, 2009). The U.S. used various entities to deal 
with post-conflict actions. Advance planning facilitated international cooperation to 
ensure proper actions for reconstruction and restoration and the establishment of a 
government. Some specialists, Orend (2007) and McCredy, advocate for states to pledge 
their jus post bellum activities and to make them an essential part of war planning. Then, 
the international community can hold states accountable if they fail to follow the 
promised post bellum actions. In the same way, the establishment of the proper cyber-
warfare jus post bellum actions will help during post-conflict resolution. A cyber post-
conflict framework before a major cyber conflict occurs will limit human suffering, and 
provide the steps for fast response, investigations, and accountability. 
As the opening quote states, it is the responsibility of all states to ensure 
everlasting peace. Consequently, this study provides a framework for cyber post-warfare 
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conduct, with emphasis on prevention and cyber weapons control. Additionally, the study 
examines the implications of deploying a cyber-weapon in terms of its reversibility, 
attribution, and planning of a cyber relief effort. 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the study’s 
justification and the purpose. Chapter II defines IHL, current jus post bellum frameworks, 
and the treaties applicable to cyber jus post bellum. Chapter III surveys cyberattacks, 
attack vectors, cyberspace damage assessment, the effects of previously deployed 
cyberattacks on military, civilians, and private organizations, and the ability to contain 
and reverse them. Chapter IV discusses damage assessment for past kinetic operations, 
the organizations involved in the recovery effort, and available international cyber 
organization that can provide support during cyber conflicts. Chapter V analyzes 
responses to cyberattacks in a case study involving South Korea and North Korea. 
Chapter VI presents a cyber-warfare jus post bellum framework, proposes a cyberattack 
relief-effort flowchart, and offers a post cyberattack cost checklist. The thesis concludes 
with a summary and recommendations for future work. 
 5 
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II. BACKGROUND 
War often leads to the dissolution of established governments and civil 
order, and the destruction of critical elements of a society’s infrastructure, 
and this dissolution or destruction may result in the post bellum suffering 
or death of many in the defeated society. Victors have a moral obligation 
to ensure the security and stabilization of a defeated nation. Whenever 
practical and possible, they must provide the essentials of life (food, 
clothing, shelter, medicine, etc.) to those without them and repair or 
rebuild infrastructure essential to a vulnerable population’s health and 
welfare. (Iasiello, 2004, p. 42) 
A. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
After Henry Dunant witnessed the bloodshed of the Battle of Solferino in 1859, 
he started the movement to establish the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) to aid the wounded (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). Swiss citizens founded the 
ICRC in 1863, which later became the overseer of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL), based on the Geneva and Hague Conventions (ICRC, 2002). The purpose of IHL 
is to provide suggested principles for states to enter into legal international contracts in 
the forms of treaties, declarations, or agreements which will provide protection during 
conflicts to civilians and personnel not participating in hostilities; it also restricts what 
weapons can be used (ICRC, 2002). However, not all states have ratified all the current 
IHL treaties and do not have to abide by the treaties they do not ratify; therefore the 
international community has customary international law, which binds all states 
(Henckaerts & Doswalk-Beck, 2005) to respect these customary international laws. As a 
result, the international community can find states in violation of customary law or 
established IHL treaties whether states are signatories of the treaties or not. Other 
international bodies involved in the preservation of international law are the United 
Nations (UN), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the International Criminal 





International Body Responsibility 
United Nations Maintains and Restores Peace 
   General Assembly Votes on new resolutions 
   Security Council 
Maintains peace and restores peace, issues sanctions 
and measures 
   ICJ 
Enforces Customary International Law as the UN judicial 
body, manages state level jurisdiction, conducts 
investigations 
ICRC 
Oversees International Humanitarian Law (Hague, 
Geneva, and other treaties), provides assistance during 
and post conflicts 
ICC 
Prosecutes war crimes, genocides, acts of aggression, 
crimes against humanity, manages individual or 
organizational level jurisdiction 
Table 1.   International Body Responsibilities 
(after ICRC, 2014; UN, 1945; ICC, 1998). 
The UN is an international body created after World War II, which also requires 
states to abide by international law as part of its charter (UN, 1945). The General 
Assembly of the UN adopted resolutions to protect human rights during armed conflict 
and peace, to include establishing ad hoc courts to deal with human rights violations 
(Gasser, 1995). The Security Council is a branch of the UN that establishes steps to 
ensure or reinstate peace while ensuring human-rights protection (Gasser, 1995). The ICJ, 
which does not specifically address IHL, is the UN prosecution body to ensure states 
abide by international conventions and customary law (ICJ, 2015). The ICC is a judicial 
international body that specifically qualifies certain violations as war crimes (ICC, 1998). 
Essentially, states are supposed to abide by these customary laws during the conduct of 
armed conflict to avoid unnecessary suffering and to protect civilians, the wounded, 
prisoners of war (POWs), civilian infrastructure, and children; if not the international 
organizations can hold states and individuals accountable for war crimes (Henckaerts & 
Doswalk-Beck, 2005). States can use the ICJ and ICC to bring issues or IHL or 
customary international law violations against other states, individuals, or organizations 
and ensure war crimes are brought to justice (ICJ, 2015; ICC, 2014). The judges assigned 
to the ICC must have knowledge of criminal law, law procedures, IHL, and the law of 
human rights (ICC, 2014). 
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The ICRC, as the overseer of IHL, attempts to maintain IHL current with newly 
invented technology and warfare weapons to avoid unnecessary suffering. This was the 
case when the ICRC updated IHL to include treaties prohibiting the use of chemical 
weapons, including their “development, production, and stockpiling” (ICRC, 2002, p. 
11). However, Dörmann (2001) argues that IHL is not weapon-dependent.  
Currently there has been much discussion about how to translate IHL into the 
newly defined cyberspace domain. Harold Hongju Koh, a United States Department of 
State Legal Advisor, has said the U.S. government believes that the principles of 
international law apply to cyberspace (Koh, 2012). More recently, the Tallinn Manual, 
published by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Centre of Excellence, proposed that established customary international laws 
apply to cyber-warfare (Schmitt, 2013). Nevertheless, there are challenges to ensure an 
ethical cyberwar, such as possible collateral damage due to computer-system 
interconnectedness and the difficulty of attribution and damage assessment (Liaropolous, 
2010). For example, one of those international rules is to distinguish between combatants 
and non-combatants in targeting, which raises questions due to links between civilian and 
military systems and the inability to contain a computer virus to a specific target.  
Furthermore, the Tallinn Manual, IHL, and customary laws do not address the 
steps states should take after the conclusion of war or after states carry out a cyberattack, 
except for prosecution of war crimes violations (Schmitt, 2013; Henckaerts & Doswalk-
Beck, 2005). Just as there are rules for the ethical consideration of the start ( jus ad 
bellum) and conduct ( jus in bello) of cyber armed conflict, we propose here that there 
should be rules for the ethical termination of a cyber armed conflict: jus post bellum—
transition from war to peace. 
B. JUS POST BELLUM 
IHL is guidelines for states to conduct righteous and ethical war. It attempts to 
ensure states remain within the legal framework during war, then referred to as just war. 
Just-war theory measures a state’s right to go to war (jus ad bellum criteria) and states’ 
conduct during war (jus in bello criteria) (Douglas, 2003). The jus ad bellum criteria are 
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just cause, right intention, right authority, reasonable hope of success, last resort, 
announcement of intention, and proportionality (Douglas, 2003). The jus in bello criteria 
are right intention, proportionality, and discrimination (Douglas, 2003). There has been 
much discussion of the frameworks of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The international 
community must start to think about the ethical and moral actions states should take after 
a war has concluded. Since just-war theory or IHL does not provide a framework for 
justice after war, scholars advocate that jus post bellum is a critical pillar of just war and 
should not be ignored (Bass, 2004; Douglas, 2003; Orend, 2007; Österdahl, 2012; 
McCready, 2009). These theologists, scholars, and ethicists introduced a framework 
known as jus post bellum theory. This phase consists of the actions states take to ethically 
end wars and transition to peace. 
Immanuel Kant is the first philosopher thought of as the founder of viewing 
warfare as consisting of three different pillars: “1. the right of going to war; 2. right 
during war; and 3. right after war” in his Metaphysics of Morals (cited in Stahn, 2006, p. 
935). Kant also expressed in his Toward Perpetual Peace, as translated and publish by 
Yale University Press, that states involved in armed conflict should not conduct acts that 
will prohibit them from being able to reach peace (Kant, 2006). As an example, Kant 
(2006) believed that peace agreements that had ulterior motives should be invalid as is it 
not a peace agreement and it only postpones a new inevitable war. Additionally, Kant 
believed that a state’s military superiority did not mean it could punish or force the 
defeated to recompense the victor (cited in Stahn, 2006). 
Douglas (2003) believes just-war criteria are outdated and should be revisited for 
current times. Douglas contends that states go through a moral deliberation when starting 
and conducting a war and he advocates for the same moral deliberation during the 
termination of war, what he calls ‘just result.’ Douglas also believes that just-war theory 
has not provided adequate criteria for jus post bellum and this could result in more 
hostilities. Moreover, Douglas believes that humanitarian relief can limit war impacts and 
the possibility of new conflict. 
Orend (2007) believes that jus post bellum has been mainly ignored due to 
tradition and because many just-war theorists include it as part of jus ad bellum. Orend 
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does concede that there should be a strong link between jus ad bellum and jus post 
bellum, but he also advocates for much more and therefore it should be a phase by itself 
of the just war framework, which should be based on Kant’s concepts. Additionally, 
Orend advocates for a jus post bellum Geneva Convention that stipulates, “what the 
winners of war may and may not do to countries and regimes they have defeated” (p. 
575). Orend proposes the following principles: rights vindication (human rights secured), 
proportionality and publicity (fair and public peace settlements), discrimination 
(distinction), punishment (hold aggressors accountable), compensation (possible 
mandated economic restitution), and rehabilitation (reconstruction). Essentially, he 
believes states should plan and have strategies for an ethical war transition. He stresses 
the benefits everyone will obtain with a set of established rules and measures, especially 
for difficult scenarios. He ascertains that these procedures will be worth it for the victors, 
defeated, and international community as a whole. 
Bass (2004) believes that jus post bellum aids states to focus the war. Bass 
focuses on three central questions relevant to postwar behavior. The questions are:  
What obligations are there to restore the sovereignty of a conquered 
country and what limitations do these obligations impose on states’ efforts 
to remake the governments of vanquished countries? What are the rights 
and obligations that belligerent states retain in the political reconstruction 
of a defeated power? Are these rights limited to the reconstruction of 
genocidal regimes, or can a case be made for the political remaking of less 
dangerous dictatorships? [And] What obligations might victorious states 
have to restore the economy and infrastructure of a defeated state? 
Conversely, do victorious states have a right to demand some kind of 
reparation payments from defeated states who were aggressors in the 
concluded war? (Bass, 2004, p. 385) 
These are important questions to consider during post-war conduct to ensure a 
moral and ethical post war behavior and long lasting peace. Bass concluded that there are 
moral duties of victors when returning to peacetime; victors should exit immediately, 
unless it is a genocidal state in which case victors have a responsibility to aid in political 
reconstruction, and advocates for “prudence and proportionality” for reparations between 
victors and aggressors. Those moral duties might include not leaving immediately, as 
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some states might require the victor to remain in place and aid in reconstruction of 
government entities and physical infrastructure. 
Iasiello (2004) also agrees that the jus post bellum is undeveloped and its 
examination can save lives, especially in a time of assured and immediate victories. 
Iasiello proposes having a plan and vision for war termination, which will ensure actions 
to rebuilt, restore, and reestablish are not broken and abide by legal and moral guidelines. 
Iasiello introduces seven criteria for post-conflict standards of behavior: “a healing mind-
set, just restoration, safeguards for the innocent, respect for the environment, post bellum 
justice, the transition of warriors, and the study of the lessons of war” (Iasiello, 2004, p. 
40). All seven criteria are important for a peace-to-war transition. Additionally, Iasiello 
proposes a three-stage interrelated approach to just restoration to allow for healing: 
protectorship (protect and provide for the victor and defeated populace), partnership 
(victor and defeated work together to restore, rebuild, and repair), and ownership 
(establish self-governance and sovereignty). Just restoration highlights the importance of 
victors not leaving the defeated in a state of disarray and destruction. It is the victor and 
defeated responsibility to ensure cooperation to ensure an eventual return to normal or 
better. 
Boon (2005), unlike the previous authors, believes that a link between jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum is not necessary. Boon advocates that the reason 
for war and how the war was fought should not affect the actions taken after war, which 
must still abide by justice principles. In addition, Boon highlights “the central tasks of 
post-conflict reconstruction: the establishment of law and order, preparation for free 
elections, establishment of the groundwork for independent institutions and the 
recognition of fundamental rights and liberties with the aim of eventual self-governance” 
(p. 290–291). To accomplish these task, Boon introduces three concepts: trusteeship 
(ethical and legal obligations to act in the best interest of the occupied state), 
accountability (hold people accountable for their actions), and proportionality (ability to 
assess the magnitude of legal intervention). Boon argues that a link is not necessary for 
ethical post-war conduct, especially for states that did not have the right to go to war or 
did not fight ethically: The international community should hold those states responsible 
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for their unethical actions, but not excuse them from their responsibility in transitioning 
from peace to war ethically because they did not fight a just war. 
Österdahl (2012) concludes that even though there is already law to ensure jus 
post bellum in combination with peace agreements, there is still a void within these laws 
to effectively establish peace after a war has concluded. Therefore, Österdahl believes 
that war-to-peace transitions require a jus post bellum methodology and transitioning 
tools. Österdahl also concludes there is a need for law specific to jus post bellum, but that 
governments might be against establishing it because of the complexity and the 
requirements to fulfill a transition from peace to war. Even though transitioning from war 
to peace can be a difficult task and event dependent, there are generalities that can be 
established to restore the peace. 
Stahn (2008) believes that the international community has largely ignored the 
transition period from war-to-peace. Stahn agrees with Österdahl that current law is 
insufficient for jus post bellum, but also that it needs to be used to regulate the war-to-
peace transition and not just as a moral slogan. Stahn argues that jus post bellum can 
essentially set rules and limitations for local and international actors. Stahn advocates for 
viewing jus post bellum as a whole by using established war-to-peace transition 
guidelines and their relationship. Stahn also states that due to the complexity of current 
wars, jus post bellum should also apply to “events other than classical wars,” as well as 
be defined case-by-case because of the inability to have a clear understanding of the end 
of hostilities (pp. 333–334). Stahn does a good job highlighting that every war is different 
and the transition should be war-specific. The ability to develop additional guidelines for 
each war can expedite the transition. 
James Turner Johnson argues that the aftermath actions are included and should 
be planned during the jus ad bellum phase (cited in McCready, 2009, p. 67). McCready 
(2009) disagrees with Johnson and argues that there needs to be a separate set of criteria 
to cover jus post bellum. He explains that jus post bellum is a misleading term as it is 
difficult to transition from war to peace due to major operations concluding and transition 
beginning before war is completely over. “The intent of establishing a jus post bellum 
category is to determine beforehand what these war-related responsibilities should be 
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after the shooting stops and who should be responsible for them” (McCready, 2009, 
p. 68). McCready appeals for a set of guidelines that can ensure states are aware of their 
post-conflict responsibility before the end of the conflict. 
Most scholars believe there is a need for an international establishment of jus post 
bellum criteria that will ensure that lasting peace is achieved post-conflict. Additionally, 
McCready, Orend (2007), and Iasiello (2004) agree that there should be a plan of action 
for post-war actions; Orend, Iasiello, and Boon (2005) advocate for ensuring 
accountability for unethical actions during conflict; Orend, Iasiello, and Bass (2004) 
stipulate some sort of compensation and or reconstruction aid post bellum; and Orend, 
Boon, and Kant (2006) recommend fair or proportionate aid and agreements. Wars are 
inevitable and after a war has ended, there could be widespread suffering and destruction; 
both victor and defeated have responsibilities to restore the state’s essential services, 
transition to peace, and end suffering. Jus post bellum introduces frameworks to develop 
treaties that could address these problems.  
C. JUS POST BELLUM IN CYBERSPACE 
Kant introduced jus post bellum framework in 1796 in the Metaphysics of Morals 
(Stahn, 2006). However, the international community views jus post bellum as an 
essential part of jus ad bellum and jus in bello (Anderson, 2014). It only gained more 
consideration in the 2000s, possibly due to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Since 
cyberspace is a new domain, much of the focus about cyberspace has been in the jus in 
bello and jus ad bellum as emphasized by the Tallinn Manual and the ICRC. Nonetheless, 
works by Giesen (2013), Denning and Strawser (2014), Rowe, Garfinkel, Beverly, and 
Yannakogeorgos (2011), and Liaropolous (2010), discussed below, can be used as a basis 
for analysis of cyberspace jus post bellum and the creation of a cyber jus post bellum 
framework. 
Giesen (2013) agrees that customary law and the UN Charter are applicable to 
cyberwar for jus ad bellum and jus in bello, but not for jus post bellum. Giesen states that 
cyberspace is now a global common, the center of gravity, and societies are dependent on 
it, which means any threat against it can be debilitating. Therefore, Giesen advocates for 
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a new international treaty for cyber jus post bellum implementation based on the Kantian 
jus post bellum. Giesen uses two criteria for an ethical cyberwar jus post bellum for the 
consequences of committing a war act, which consist of agreement violations that can 
disserve all people and conduct that makes peace impossible. She advocates an 
international agreement that bans any cyberwar act that will cause enough detrimental 
“economic and social damage” that peace will not be possible. She focuses on the 
prevention of cyberattacks rather than the actions after an attack was conducted or the 
war has ended, a deterrence approach to cyberwar such as with nuclear weapons. 
Giesen’s approach is similar to Geib and Lahmann (2012) who advocate for the 
protection of critical civilian cyber infrastructure. Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (API) (1977) outlines protected sites such as 
dams and dykes but also provides some stipulations that will allow a military force to 
target these. The international community could add critical cyber infrastructure to the 
protected sites list or an international agreement could be signed banning attacks on 
certain critical cyberspace targets. In addition, the repercussions of such cyber acts on 
such targets will need to be made sufficiently great to aggressors and guidelines for 
investigation and indicting infringers will need to be established. 
Denning and Strawser (2014) advocate for cyber weapons use instead of kinetic 
weapons after the cyber weapon meets the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria. They 
argue that using cyber weapons can pose less risk to both friendly and adversary military 
and non-combatants. Denning and Strawser also argue that the use of cyber weapons can 
aid in the jus post bellum phase during stability and reconstruction. Their main argument 
in the reconstruction phase is that the lethality or permanent damage of cyber weapons is 
low. Therefore, the reconstruction phase will consist of restoring data from backup files, 
which will be faster than having to rebuild infrastructure after a physical attack. It might 
seem like Denning and Strawser are contradicting Giesen’s proposed ban of cyber 
weapons. That is not the case, as the only time they are advocating for the use of cyber 
weapons in place of kinetic weapons will be dependent on the ability of the cyber 
weapons to have results that are more ethical. 
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Rowe et al. (2011) propose an international agreement similar to chemical 
weapons. The agreement would outline when states can use cyberattacks, it would require 
states to police cyber criminals, and it would stipulate which cyber weapons are 
acceptable. They argue that cyber arms control is possible now more than ever due to the 
increasing capabilities of forensic tools and the ability to observe cyberattack 
development. An acceptable weapons agreement would mandate the use of only 
attributable and reversible attacks and a state could use digital signatures with a 
cyberattack to establish attribution. An example of a reversible cryptography attack, as 
proposed by Rowe (2010), is “where the attacker encrypts data or programs to prevent 
their use, then decrypts them after hostilities have ceased.” States will be encouraged to 
use reversible attacks if they are responsible for reparations on the attacked state and 
states understand that other cyberattacks can damage their reputation. Reversible attacks 
can also limit the escalation of force and satisfy the appropriate use of force. These 
revisable attacks will make it easier to restore systems to their original state. The biggest 
obstacle, they see is attribution due to states’ not taking ownership of cyberattacks. 
Liaropolous (2010) defines jus post bellum criteria based on the widely accepted 
Orend framework: Proportionality, Rights Vindication, Discrimination, Punishment, and 
Compensation. However, Liaropolous does not actually define how Orend’s criteria 
apply to cyberspace. He argues that even though it might seem like waging war through 
cyberspace is more ethical and result in fewer casualties, it would not necessarily be the 
case. That is because a cyberattack can destroy public services such as electricity, 
transportation, and water, and possibly even paralyze a technical city, which will directly 
target critical infrastructure (Liaropolous, 2010). In addition, Liaropolous warns that due 
to the blurry escalation of force in cyberspace, the result can be a “bloody war” with 
more casualties that were supposed to be avoided. Therefore, Liaropolous advocates for 
the need of conventions to outlaw the development of cyber weapons that can be used as 
weapons of mass destructions. 
All these scholars agree in the basic principles of creating some sort of cyber 
agreement for the use of cyber weapons and the outlawing of indiscriminate cyber 
weapons to stop cyber actors before they conduct a detrimental cyberattack. These 
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agreements will focus on deterring cyber actors by having severe consequences for any 
violation. Additionally, critical infrastructure can be added to the protected sites and only 
cyber weapons proven to be more ethical should be used to limit human suffering and 
facilitate reconstruction post bellum. 
D. TREATIES AND ARTICLES APPLICABLE TO JUS POST BELLUM 
As new atrocities occurred during war, the international community through the 
UN, ICRC, and other parties introduced new treaties, conventions, charters, and 
declarations to control armed conflicts and the subsequent peace. The basic principles of 
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) include distinction, proportionality, military necessity, 
and humanity (Carr, 2011). One important thing to note is that LOAC is often developed 
in response to incidents and to ensure they are not repeated. For example, in 1977, the 
ICRC added the API that includes further protection for civilians and civilian objects 
during warfare, but only 174 countries have ratified it (ICRC, 2014). This API specifies 
in Article 51 the protection for civilians from being military targets and Article 52 affords 
the same protection for civilian objects. 
The UN charter (1945) does not specify anything about the LOAC as its main 
purpose is to maintain peace. Still, the UN passes resolutions to protect civilians, such as 
UN resolution 2675 in 1970. This resolution specifies that during “the conduct of military 
operations, every effort should be made to spare civilian populations from the ravages of 
war, and all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to 
civilian populations” (UN, 1970). 
As mentioned earlier, these international laws are mainly for jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello; nevertheless, some agreements do have post-conflict stipulations. The following 
treaties and charters extracted from the international law convey the range of stipulations 
about jus post bellum. For a more complete list of current international treaties, refer to 
Appendix A which lists current international treaties including the established date, 
number of state parties and signatories, main purpose, and the possible applicability to jus 
post bellum. ICRC (2014) is the source providing the following information for the listed 
international treaties, unless otherwise stated. 
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1. Hague Conventions 
 These conventions define the provisions for war declaration, belligerent conduct 
during war on land, the prohibition or restrictions of certain weapons and capturing in 
naval war, the conversion of merchant ships to warships, and the protection of hospital 
ships, neutral states, undefended locations, and cultural property. These conventions 
“embody customary international law”; as such, violators are to be prosecuted for war 
crimes after the termination of hostilities. After conflict, cultural property is to be 
returned, restitution made, and assistance provided for recovery after the conflict ends. In 
cyber-warfare, the establishment of neutral powers makes their territory impenetrable. 
2. Geneva Convention 
These conventions afford protection to the wounded, sick, medical units and 
personnel, chaplains, voluntary aid, civilians and personnel not taking part in hostilities, 
victims of international and non-international armed conflict, medical material and 
locations, shipwreck, and hospital ships. It also prohibits perfidy, provides guidelines for 
treatment of POWs, and facilitates the identification of protected personnel. Violations of 
these conventions are prosecutable under war crimes after the end of hostilities. 
Belligerents are to release and return POWs at the conclusion of the armed conflict. In 
cyber-warfare, the prohibition of perfidy can be an issue as many attacks can involve 
impersonation. 
3. Conventions Prohibiting Certain Conventional Weapons 
These conventions prohibit the use of weapons that cause excessive injury or have 
indiscriminate effects. Furthermore, additional protocols prohibit the use of weapons that 
produce undetectable fragments with x-ray and lasers causing permanent blindness, 
provide restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps, incendiary weapons, and minimize 
“risks and effects of explosive remnants of war.” Violations of these conventions are also 
prosecutable under war crimes after the end of hostilities. Additionally, states are 
responsible for marking, clearing, removing, or destroying “explosive remnants of war in 
affected territories” in attempts to protect people from additional harm. 
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4. Additional Treaties Prosecutable for War Crimes  
The Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases prohibits “the use of projectiles 
[that] the sole object…is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases” and the 
Convention Statutory Limitations to War Crimes “established no statutory limitation for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Violations of these conventions are also 
prosecutable under war crimes after the end of hostilities. 
5. Genocide  
The declaration on the Prevention on the Convention and Punishment of 
Genocide establishes genocide as an international crime during peace and war. Violations 
of genocide are prosecutable under peace and war crimes. 
6. Mercenaries  
The Organization of African Unity Convention on Mercenaries provides 
guidelines to end mercenarism and calls for post-conflict prosecution and extradition. 
Furthermore, the Convention on Mercenaries makes the recruitment, use, financing, and 
training of mercenaries prosecutable. 
7. Additional Rights Violations 
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child is aimed at protecting children and 
calls for the recovery and reintegration of children post-conflict.  
8. UN Charter 
The UN currently has 193 members (UN, 2014) bound by the UN Charter (1945) 
containing several articles that apply during jus post bellum or after an attack has been 
conducted. However, a state must first infringe the peace or commit an act of aggression. 
Therefore, through the UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974), the UN defined an 
act of aggression and allows the UN Security Council freedom to determine if any 
particular act is considered an act of aggression. 
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a. Article 39 
Under this article, the UN Security Council bears response responsibility for 
“threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression.” The UN can use Article 41, 
which includes measures such as sanctions that do not involve armed forces, and or 
Article 42, which includes the use of an armed force, to respond to the armed attack. 
Even though what constitutes an act of aggression or armed attack in cyberspace is still 
being debated, this article is important due to the requirement of UN response after an 
attack has been conducted. 
b. Article 51 
 This article allows states to defend themselves against armed attacks and gives 
states the right to respond when under attack. 
c. Article 92  
This article establishes the ICJ as the judicial body of the UN. The ICJ articles 
relevant to jus post bellum are discussed below. 
d. Article 94  
This article stipulates that states will comply with the decisions taken by the ICJ. 
This means that after the ICJ has ruled on a case brought to it, the member states must 
abide by the decision. 
9. Statute of the ICJ  
The UN Charter (1945) established the ICJ as the judicial body of the UN. 
Disputes and war crimes between states are brought to the court and under article 94, 
mentioned above, states are to comply with the court’s verdict. 
a. Article 36  
This article establishes the court’s jurisdiction about “the interpretation of a 
treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact which, if established, 
would constitute a breach of an international obligation” (ICJ, 2015). In addition, the 
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court decides “the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an 
international obligation” (ICJ, 2015). This means that the ICJ has the power to apply law 
and issue verdicts. 
b. Article 38  
This article stipulates that the court will apply international conventions and 
customary law to matters submitted to it (ICJ, 2015). This article gives the ICJ leeway to 
determine if acts not explicitly outlined in resolutions or treaties are violations. 
c. Article 41 
This article gives the court the power to issue measures to protect states’ rights 
(ICJ, 2015). That means that the ICJ can issue a mandate to protect states. 
10. ICC  
The Rome Statute established the ICC in 1998 and 154 states are parties to the 
ICC, but not the United States (ICRC, 2014). Unlike the ICJ that settles matters between 
states, the ICC settles disputes against individuals and organizations (ICC, 2014) and 
exercises authority over severe “crimes of international concern” (ICC, 1998). During jus 
post bellum, the ICC can settle violation disputes. Under Article 5, the ICC has 
jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes committed during 
war, and acts of aggression. War crimes refer to violations of the Geneva conventions and 
international LOAC. 
11. NATO  
The North Atlantic Treaty (1949) is an international agreement and under Article 
5 reserves the right of member states to respond in an individual or collective way to acts 
considered armed attacks. The response can include the use of an armed force and 
requires UN Security Council notification. The response is to cease once the UN Security 
Council has taken steps “to restore and maintain international peace and security.” NATO 




In conclusion, the majority of IHL, international customary law, treaties, charters, 
and so on are concerned with the right of states to go to war and stipulations to fight wars 
ethically. The main consideration for the aftermath of war is the prosecution of war 
crimes and deterring actors with prohibition agreements and treaties. Nonetheless, these 
agreements can be used as an example to develop a new treaty for ethical cyber-warfare 
jus post bellum. For example, these international agreements already ban indiscriminate 
weapons before they are used, which would include indiscriminate cyber weapons, and 
mandate respect of neutral territories. In addition, the frameworks and ideas presented by 
the discussed theologists, scholars, and ethicists can aid in the creation of a cyber jus post 
bellum framework for an ethical transition from war to peace. A treaty outlining the jus 
post bellum criteria for cyber-warfare will be beneficial for the international community.  
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III. CYBERATTACKS 
Policy makers need a basic understanding of the different types of cyberattacks: 
the feasibility of conducting cyberattacks through different vectors, their effects, ways of 
establishing attribution, and the ability to contain and reverse them. This will aid policy 
makers in generating correct policies and international agreements to deal with the 
aftermath of a cyberattack. In the same manner, an understanding of cyberattack 
characteristics and effects will help develop correct post-cyber-conflict actions. 
News of cyberattacks is an everyday occurrence around the world. It is evident by 
news stories of cyberattacks to steal money, information, and intelligence, break 
computer systems, modify information, and or make information inaccessible to 
legitimate users. There is a huge cost associated with responding to cyberattacks on 
information systems, which includes assessing the damage, attempting to establish 
attribution, and restoring systems and information. For example, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) estimated that botnets have cost U.S. victims losses totaling 9 billion 
dollars (Demarest, 2014). Not all these attacks constitute an act of war; in fact, no single 
attack to date has been agreed by any consensus to be an act of war. These attacks have 
generally been categorized as criminal and have been costly. However, some of these 
cyberattacks were state-on-state and could have been considered an act of war. 
Cyberattack is a broad term because it encompasses low-level attacks and major attacks 
by any entity. Therefore, there should be a distinction between cyber act of war and other 
cyber activities. The distinction can be made in international agreements, with the 
understanding that to be categorized as a cyber act of war, the attack would have to meet 
a designated list of criteria. For example, Schmitt (2013) defines a cyber act of war by 
these criteria: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, 
military character, state involvement, and presumptive legitimacy. 
Even though there should be a distinction between a cyber act of war and other 
cyber activities, aggressors in cyberspace use the same methods to develop and carry out 
cyberattacks. These actions usually include deciding on a target, establishing goals, 
conducting reconnaissance, deciding on the type of attack and attack vector, and carrying 
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out the attack. Cyber criminals focus on financial gain and do not give too much thought 
to possible collateral damage. On the other hand, state actors should be more concerned 
with developing cyber weapons that can be contained or reversed and can achieve the 
same objectives, which would limit human suffering, collateral damage, and further 
public’s acceptance and trust. Developers could check this through careful testing of the 
cyber weapon on target and non-target systems to ensure it has the desired effects. Cyber-
weapon developers must be able to determine if the deployed weapon will meet the 
desired effects, and determine cascading effects, to inform the decision makers of cyber-
weapon deployment consequences. 
A. TYPES OF CYBERATTACKS 
States design cyber weapons to accomplish different effects depending on the 
desired outcome, unlike a kinetic weapon used mainly to destroy a target. The 
cyberattacks on computer systems affect confidentiality, integrity, and or availability. 
This section provides a description of various cyberattacks and their usage to achieve 
military objectives. It is important to note that technical expertise and financial backing 
are limiting factors for cyber-weapon development. However, there are cyberattacks 
readily available for a price that can cause damage without much technical knowledge, 
which enables non-state and developing states to use cyber weapons too. Paramilitaries 
and militaries can use publicly available cyberattacks, modify them, or apply their own 
developed malicious codes, to disrupt, destroy, deny, and degrade an enemy to obtain the 
military advantage. 
Denial of service (DoS) and distributed-DoS (DDoS) are cyberattacks that target 
availability of computer systems to legitimate users. Aggressors would use one or 
multiple systems to swamp an Internet-connected system with data to render it or its 
resources unavailable (Schmitt, 2013). A military unit can use this attack to prevent 
communications or make air-defense systems unavailable during a military operation. 
According to Ponemon Institute (2013), DoS attacks are the most costly type of attack 
due to their frequency.  
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However, most attacks involve malware. Malware is malicious code that has 
negative effects on computer systems. Aggressors develop the code and deliver it through 
“attack vectors”. Aggressors embed malicious code in software, firmware, and hardware; 
examples include logic bombs, rootkits, viruses, and worms (Schmitt, 2013). A military 
unit can use malware to destroy systems, delete data, or spy on their enemies. The 
Ponemon Institute (2013) reported an average of 49.8 days to resolve malware attacks, 
which equals an average cost of over 1.5 million dollars per incident.  
An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) consists of an aggressor that was able to 
gain access to a system and established a foothold into the system. APTs use various 
methods, as depicted in Figure 1, to break into computer systems while remaining 
undetected to gather intelligence or conduct other types of activities (Symantec, 1995). 
Military units can establish APTs to set up future sabotage activities. 
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Figure 1.  Advanced Persistent Threat (from Symantec, 1995). 
B. CYBERATTACK VECTORS 
Attack vectors are the method, people, or vessels by which cyber actors deliver 
cyberattacks. Aggressors decide on attack vectors in conjunction with the attack type and 
it can depend on the target’s cyber-security posture. For example, an organization with 
out-of-date patches is an easier target for access exploits, as vulnerability lists and 
exploits to those vulnerabilities exists all over the Internet. Aggressors are able to 
determine devices’ operating systems and versions during reconnaissance, which helps 
them determine the method of delivery. Attack vectors also facilitate targets of 
opportunity. 
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Social engineering often involves the use of deceptive emails, Webpages, and 
links that entice a target to unknowingly download malicious code. Social engineering 
includes phishing (mass emails), spear phishing (targeted emails), and whaling 
(executive-target emails). These attack vectors are commonly used because they are very 
successful with large groups of people (Kevin Mandia, Presentation, March 26, 2014). 
This means that at least one of the targets will click or download the malicious file, 
giving the attacker an access point into the targeted network. Social engineering can be 
the first step in either establishing an APT, logic bombs, or botnets. 
Malicious insiders are personnel within an organization that are willing to aid an 
aggressor. Silowash, Cappelli, Moore, Trzeciak, Shimeall, and Flynn (2012) defined a 
malicious insider as someone who had or has legitimate access to information and 
deliberately performed acts that targeted the organization’s confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability. Malicious insiders have the ability to cause more damage than other 
aggressors because they not only have access to the systems but they know more about 
the targeted system’s vulnerabilities. Aggressors can recruit and use malicious insiders 
against air-gapped systems such as air-traffic control. 
Botnets are networks of compromised computer systems directed by an aggressor 
to carry out coordinated cyberattacks (Schmitt, 2013). Computer systems in botnets are 
usually unwilling participants that augment the aggressor’s ability to conduct 
cyberattacks. Aggressors use botnets to enhance DDoS attacks or as pivot points to hide 
their tracks. 
Zero-day attacks refer to newly discovered vulnerabilities and are the most 
difficult attack vectors to develop and discover; they require higher technical knowledge 
because they involve finding an unknown system flaw or vulnerability to introduce the 
malicious code. The software vulnerabilities are unknown to software developers and 
vendors (Zetter, 2011) and hence they are hard to counter. Symantec reported that there is 
less than one zero-day exploit out of the one million malware samples they receive per 
month (Zetter, 2011), which demonstrates the rarity and difficulty of finding zero-day 
vulnerabilities. 
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Removable media, such as universal serial bus (USB) drives, could be used by a 
malicious insider or unwilling participant to inadvertently introduce malicious code if the 
removable media was not properly scanned before plugging it to the network. Other types 
of removable media that can transfer viruses include laptops, writable compact discs, and 
tablets. For example, Zetter reports that the attack vectors used to deliver the Stuxnet 
worm against Iran were an infected USB thumb drive and a malicious insider. 
Unknowing participants can also deliver malicious code through USBs, as in 2009 in the 
United Kingdom with the Conficker worm which resulted in over 15 million worldwide 
infected computer systems (Whittaker, 2013). Even after these incidents, Whittaker 
reports that U.S. Department of Defense continues to allow these devices on secure 
system to expedite work processes instead of security and policy adherence. 
C. CYBERATTACK EFFECTS  
This section will discuss three cases: Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and Iran 
(2010) to illustrate the different effects cyberattacks can have on systems, infrastructure, 
and civilians. In addition to these cases, the Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) hack will 
be discussed below and in a later chapter as these attacks are a good example of state-
sponsored attacks. The effects can be physical, economical, and or social with excessive 
collateral damage. Even though no one has categorized these cyberattacks as armed 
attacks, the cases highlight the disregard for Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) adherence 
seen in cyber-warfare-like attacks, especially in targeting civilian entities and 
infrastructure. In addition, states are legally and morally bound by LOAC whether they 
are taking part in hostilities or not.  
In 2007, in response to relocating a Russian bronze-soldier war memorial, Estonia 
suffered cyberattacks for over a month (Kaska et al., 2010). The targets were government 
e-services Websites, banks, Internet infrastructure, and media outlets. Estonia’s big 
Internet footprint and attack coordination made the attack more powerful and successful. 
Coordination of times, target lists, and instructions on how to carry out the attacks were 
made available to the public; therefore anyone with a connection that wanted to 
contribute could contribute. The attacks grew in intensity and sophistication, starting with 
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ping requests, then later used malformed Web queries and botnets while hiding their 
identity though proxies and Internet Protocol (IP) address spoofing. Aggressors use 
proxies and IP spoofing to mask the attack origin. The botnets’ command and control 
were placed in locations that would not cooperate with investigations, which highlighted 
the need for international agreements on cooperation, investigations, and prosecution of 
cybercrime and cyber-warfare. Between 95 and 97% of Estonians conduct online 
banking, so these cyberattacks damaged the Estonian economy because the ability for all 
businesses to function was stopped, even though total losses have not been reported. 
These attacks also had negative social effects since Estonia’s primary means of 
communication between citizens and government is through the Internet. Even the 
information coming out of Estonia was severely restricted. Kaska et al. qualified these 
events as being in a higher category than cyber crime, yet Estonia only prosecuted one 
person for these attacks. 
In 2008, Georgia was the target of cyberattacks coupled by kinetic Russian 
attacks (Kaska et al., 2010). Schmitt (2013) argues that since these cyberattacks were part 
of hostilities, LOAC should have governed them. Just as with Estonia, the targets 
included governments, news and media outlets, and financial organizations (Kaska et al., 
2010). Making civilian organizations primary targets is the reason Schmitt argues that 
these attacks were in violation of LOAC. The attacks were coordinated and included 
botnets, DoS, DDoS, Web defacements, and e-mail spamming (Kaska et al., 2010). The 
DoS and Web defacement are easy to repair (Rowe, 2010), still these attacks were 
unethical because the Georgian Government was unable to communicate with its citizens 
(Kaska et al., 2010). This exemplifies another case where possibly a nation-state targeted 
civilian organizations and should be held accountable post-conflict for actions conducted 
during conflict. 
In 2010, a Belarus security organization discovered the Stuxnet worm that had 
targeted the Natanz nuclear facility (Zetter, 2011). Symantec analysts believe the attack 
was to prevent Iran from building their nuclear weapon arsenal. The attack used malware 
against a Siemens industrial-control system and its vectors were zero-day vulnerabilities, 
a USB, and a malicious insider. The attack affected thousands of centrifuges and it was 
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the first time that there was an observable physical reaction from a cyberattack. This 
cyberattack shows the secondary physical effects a cyberattack can have through code 
manipulation. Antivirus organizations updated and distributed prevention signatures, and 
even then, over 100,000 computer systems suffered collateral damage. Antivirus 
organizations can do as much as possible to prevent further computer infections, but 
some malware has the ability to evade those protections. 
Because of the excessive damage cyberattacks can cause, cyber operations need to 
follow an operations-planning and targeting process to vet and validate legal targets and 
methods of attack. States would be in violation of LOAC if civilians are primary military 
targets without a strategic significance (Rowe, 2010), which has been the case with 
various cyberattacks.  Cyber operators must be able to determine if the deployed weapon 
will meet the desired effects while taking in consideration LOAC limitations, such as 
prohibitions on indiscriminate weapons and on making civilians or protected objects 
primary targets. 
D. CYBER-WEAPON DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
Conducting battle damage assessment (BDA) for conventional weapons is easier 
than conducting cyber-weapon deployment damage assessment. The three phases for 
conducting BDA are assessment of physical damage, functional damage, and functional 
assessment (DOD, 2013). More than one source may be required to accurately perform 
BDA, such as geospatial intelligence, video, and human intelligence, though sometimes 
one source may be sufficient (DOD, 2013). For example, after a kinetic weapon 
deployment, a flyover can reveal the physical damaged it caused and whether it achieved 
the objective. In cyberspace, it can be difficult to determine whether the damage is long 
lasting, as with viruses that can keep attacking until removed.  
Determining damage in cyberspace includes assessing the value of the systems, 
the value of the data, the impact on the organization, and the difficulty of the restoration 
of the systems. Additionally, damage of cyberattacks can be direct, indirect, or derivative 
(Park, 2010). Park proposes an enumeration of costs to correctly assess the damage of a 
cyberattack, such as acquisition cost of the items or tools needed to recover systems, 
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operations cost for both internal and external personnel, business-opportunity losses, and 
indirect cost such as reputation, weighted by the type of agency attacked. The Ponemon 
Institute (2013) report also identifies direct, indirect, and opportunity costs and adds to 
the list detection, investigation, containment, and information losses to determine the 
total cyberattack cost. Each portion of the assessments requires technical knowledge. The 
conduct of a cyberattack investigation can also take a significant amount of time because 
it requires digital forensics, which must be performed by experts if it is to be performed 
correctly and hold up in court (Casey, 2011). So there are several challenges if we are to 
properly conduct cyberattacks damage assessments. 
As another perspective, damage assessment is described by Jakobson (2011) to 
include four steps to determine the impact of a cyberattack. He outlines the steps as attack 
point detection, direct impact assessment, impact propagation, and mission impact 
assessment (Figure 2). The steps are sequential. The objective of step 1 is to discover the 
target. There might be no damage and to find out if an attack was successful, it must meet 
certain conditions, such as a target having exploitable vulnerabilities. Step 2 consists of 
determining the impact on the affected system. Step 3 is to determine the impact to other 
systems the cyberattack touched. Step 4 consists of determining the impact from the 
combined steps in conjunction with the mission status. Jakobson’s impact assessment can 
only be conducted in cyberspace if you have inside knowledge of how the cyberattack 
affected the enemy’s mission. This lack of knowledge only allows for internal use of this 
impact assessment process. 
 
Figure 2.  Mission Cyber Security Assessment Process (from Jakobson, 2011). 
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Jakobson’s assessment process does have difficulties with cyberattacks. For 
instance, belligerent and victim can easily observe a DDoS attack, but a belligerent may 
not be able to determine if a malware code is making a system malfunction as was 
intended. Proper damage assessment requires that the attacker have a way to continue 
receiving reports for what the deployed cyber-weapon is doing. If the victim takes the 
targeted systems offline, a common response to cyberattacks, it would be harder for the 
attacker to know if the cyberattack worked. Because of the difficulty of conducting BDA 
in cyberspace and inability to determine if the objective was achieved, a cyber unit may 
be encouraged to overkill with cyberattacks in the form of multiple simultaneous methods 
that can have extensive collateral damage and increase the difficulty of post bellum 
restoration of services. 
E. ATTRIBUTION 
All the previously discussed attacks have had economic and social costs and no 
state has been held accountable; that should not be acceptable to the international 
community. For example, Schmitt (2013) claimed that the Stuxnet attack was 
discriminate as it only damaged the intended systems. This is untrue because no one took 
responsibility for the attack, hence the aggressor(s) did not have to deal with the cost to 
antivirus companies and the over 100,000 infected computers systems. Even when there 
has been no proved attribution for cyberattacks, efforts to attribute are not futile, as 
investigators can use some technical steps and other significant events to establish an 
acceptable level of attribution. In addition, nontechnical factors can provide enough 
attribution to incite international action. 
Significant events such as political statements can establish some level of 
attribution. For instance, Russia was outspoken about their displeasure with Estonia’s 
decision to relocate the bronze soldier and the cyberattack intensity was associated with 
other political events involving Russia (Kaska et al., 2010). These public actions 
encouraged the attackers to continue their efforts, and Russia should bear some 
responsibility. During the investigation of the Estonia attacks, Russia’s government 
refused to cooperate or to take any action to stop the offenders (Clarke & Knake, 2010); 
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such lack of cooperation can suggest a culprit or at least an abettor. The degree of 
sophistication of the later attacks also suggests the Russian government most likely 
provided some type of aid. 
Russia also most likely sponsored the 2008 Georgia cyberattacks, as it followed 
shortly afterward with kinetic attacks. Another example is the cyberattacks South Korea 
has endured over the years, which can be correlated to significant political or historical 
events for North Korea. That correlation and the lack of other obvious suspects makes 
North Korea the likely culprit. Other attribution indicators are the level of sophistication 
and whether the cyberattack lacked financial gain goals; as Zetter explains, Stuxnet had 
no financial gain and the level of sophistication pointed to a state cyber unit as its origin. 
However, a political or other significant event alone cannot be the sole determinant for 
state attribution since it is not hard for a state to fabricate evidence of involvement of 
another state. 
Technical steps can establish attribution such as forensic analysis and tracking the 
attack origin. Nevertheless, finding the originating attack location can be misleading 
because, as Schmitt argues, it is easy to conceal the origin of an attack through IP address 
spoofing, botnets, or pivot point to hide their tracks. Rowe (2015) also discusses the 
inability to attribute attacks to nation-states even if we find the attack origin because it 
will be hard to establish that it was a state directed attack and not an individual acting 
alone. State cooperation to aid in the investigation and prosecution will help in such 
cases. Brenner (2007) argues that if the attack origin is from the same location over a 
length of time it can aid in establishing attribution. Additionally, Rowe (2015) suggests 
investigators conduct back tracing quickly enough before systems delete information to 
determine the true origin, which can be facilitated by unique packets or obtaining the 
systems involved. An analysis of the malware code can also establish attribution, since 
“the structure and style of the attack may inferentially identify the organization 
responsible for it” (Brenner, 2007, p. 408). Researchers, such as Krsul and Spafford 
(1996), have proposed the analysis of code characteristics to find code authorship, as 
programmers tend to reuse familiar language code and styles. Krsul and Spafford also 
ascertain that there are many other features within a program that indicate authorship 
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such as blank lines, not just its structure. During Krsul’s and Spafford’s research, correct 
authorship was inferred even when skills improved and programmers changed some of 
their programming characteristics. Analyzing the malware to establish authorship by 
matching the attack to previous known malicious code or getting the actual systems 
involved in the attack can provide sufficient information for attribution through forensic 
analysis. 
If the attackers conducted file exfiltration, an investigation may find the final 
location of the extracted files. The extracted files have a traversal path that may be 
trackable. Following the traversal path may introduce jurisdiction issues, as the packets 
may have traversed different states. However, if jurisdiction is not a problem, 
investigations can establish the origin of the traffic by a variety of means (Clark & 
Landau, 2010), and the final destination can also be established through the same process. 
The final destination “will necessitate a two-way exchange of information [which] 
requires the use of valid source addresses” (Clark & Landau, 2010, p. 38). Casey (2011) 
explains these extractions as having evidence linking offender and victim, similar to a 
physical crime scene reflected in Figure 3. He explains that an offender in the physical 
world might leave something behind that establishes a connection between victim and 
offender, and in the same way a cyber actor can leave traces behind such as logs or 
extracted files. Essentially, “there will always be evidence of the interaction, although in 
some cases it may not be detected easily” (Casey, 2011, p. 16). 
 
Figure 3.  Evidence Transfer Physical and Digital Dimensions (from Casey, 
2011). 
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The 2014 SPE hack was attributed to North Korea (FBI, 2014). SPE and movie 
theaters were threatened to stop movie distribution (FBI, 2014) of a satirical movie with 
the plot to murder the North Korean leader (FoxNews.com, 2015). Clearly, North Korea 
was unhappy with such a movie and was the major suspect in the cyberattacks. The FBI 
also used technical steps to establish authorship by correlating previously used malware 
linked to North Korea in signatures and algorithms. In addition, the FBI recognized in the 
attacks some IP addresses previously used for attacks that had been associated to North 
Korean cyber actors. Additionally, the attacker used the same tools in March 2013 attacks 
against South Korea, which the FBI attributed to North Korea (FBI, 2014). This 
particular cyberattack was a clear violation of international and customary established 
laws, as the primary target was a civilian organization targeted by a nation-state. 
However, it would not be enough for the FBI to say who did it for worldwide acceptance 
without tangible proof. This is because others counter the claim that this particular attack 
was by North Korea (FoxNews.com, 2015). Nonetheless, this case sets precedence for 
attributing a particular attack to a nation-state. 
F. CONTAINABILITY AND REVERSIBILITY OF CYBER WEAPONS  
Containment of cyberattacks is an important issue in repairing the damage of such 
attacks. For instance, once a worm malware attack commences, it may take only seconds 
for the worm to propagate and infect hundreds or thousands of computer systems. In the 
case of Stuxnet, the aggressors designed the attack to target explicit software and 
hardware combinations (Schmitt, 2013). Even though it targeted a closed network, it still 
managed to infect civilian computer systems. The LOAC does allow for collateral 
damage necessary to achieve a significant military objective, so long as the attacker seeks 
to minimize collateral damage and believes it is not excessive, and damage is easier to 
determine with kinetic attacks due to their deterministic nature. Conversely, the 
concealment that cyberspace provides to aggressors makes them more likely to deploy 
cyberattacks and to be careless during those attacks. This is especially true with the 
difficulties of attribution and ease of plausible deniability in cyberspace. Some 
cyberattacks are uncontainable because that is their nature, such as self-replicating worms 
and viruses. Nevertheless, other cyberattacks can be precise, such as specifically crafted 
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malware, DoS, DDoS, and APTs. Despite the longer time to design and test a precise 
cyber-weapon, it is a states’ responsibility to ensure minimal collateral damage and to 
abide by the LOAC. 
One way to reduce long-term collateral damage is for states to design cyber 
weapons to be reversible as suggested by Rowe (2010). Rowe proposes four different 
reversible attacks: cryptographic attacks (encrypting a victim’s information), obfuscating 
attacks (reorganizing data or software), withholding-information attacks (making data 
unavailable), and resource-deception attacks (creating deceptive messages). The 
reversibility that these attacks provide allows the aggressor to undo the damage quickly, 
as for example providing the decryption key for encrypted data (Rowe, 2010). This could 
be useful because most attacks require a significant amount of resources to reverse. It 
might be difficult to find the attack (Rowe, 2010), especially for attacks such as APTs, 
and the cost of an attack rises as the time to resolve it increases (PI, 2013). In addition, as 
the level of knowledge required increases to reverse the attack, the costlier it gets. 
Damage to data may be reversible but still costly, especially concerning physical and 
psychological effects (Rowe, 2010). Reversing effects can be costly because the attack 
has to be found, and the organization would have to conduct a damage assessment and 
forensic analysis, restore systems and data from backups, update antivirus software, and 
notify victims if data was stolen. Furthermore, victims would never be able to recover 
additional losses from non-availability or loss of intellectual property, especially without 
attribution. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The deployment and proliferation of cyber weapons will continue to grow. Geers, 
Kindlund, Moran, and Rachwald (2013) claim that we will continue to see an increase in 
nation-state cyber-weapons usage, mainly because of the lack of attribution. States can 
use various types of cyberattacks and methods of delivery in cyberspace. These attacks 
can have significant psychological and physical effects. These cyberattacks are costly and 
establishing attribution to a nation-state can aid during conflict resolution, clean up, and 
restitution (Rowe, 2015). 
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It will be important to recognize cyberattacks that are part of cyberwar, then 
assign state attribution. An aggregation of technical and significant factors can facilitate 
attribution. Clark and Landau (2010) proposed that when nation-states conduct data 
exfiltration the attribution level does not have to meet the same requirements to stand up 
in court, as it becomes a national security issue. In addition, Casey (2011) proposed 
having a set of standard procedures for the collection of evidence after an attack. The 
international community can facilitate this by establishing cooperation agreements where 
a neutral third party would handle international investigations. This organization would 
be essential for the international community to establish attribution and ensure 
accountability. Cooperation on investigations and prosecution is easier said than done, as 
there are states that will not cooperate because they mandated or encouraged the attack, 
or because the state might benefit from the cyberattacks and be willing to turn a blind 
eye. This is where established international bodies and national policy are helpful for 
such things as sanctions. For example, the United States has issued sanctions in 
retaliation to North Korea’s SPE hack (FoxNews.com, 2015), which shows to the world 
the U.S. government’s certainty of their culpability. The international community can 
also use attribution and accountability as deterrents because they can set precedents for 










IV. PAST KINETIC OPERATIONS 
When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national 
interests, the U.S. national leadership may decide to conduct a major 
operation or campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the United 
States in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail 
against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and 
establish conditions favorable to the [Host Nation], the United States, and 
its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often requires 
joint forces to conduct stability operations to restore security, provide 
essential services and humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency 
reconstruction. (DOD, 2011a, p. V-31) 
A. STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Some of the authors urge for a jus post bellum plan before the start or cessation of 
hostilities to ensure an easier war to peace transition during a conflict (Orend, 2007; 
Iasiello 2004; McCready 2009). The U.S. military does follow this advice by preparing 
plans for jus post bellum activities during the operation-planning process. The military-
planning manuals refer to these as stability operations. Understanding stability operations 
and analyzing past operations post-conflict activities can help to frame cyber conflict 
activities. This section will focus on the 2003 Iraq War and the 1998 Kosovo War actions 
during the operations’ reconstruction phase, the entities involved during the relief effort, 
reconstruction cost, recovery challenges, and possible cyber considerations to extrapolate 
cyber conflict similarities and differences. 
Stability operations are generally defined as actions to secure and restore essential 
services following any type of operation (DOD, 2011a). The operation-planning process 
consists of six phases as depicted in Figure 4: shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, 
stabilize, and enable civil authority. Transitions between phases mark a clear distinction 
in objectives; each phase requires planning and preparation; each phase sets provisions 
and conditions for the next phase; and phases can be interconnected. For example, 
minimizing collateral damage when conducting combat operations in the dominate phase 
facilitates stability operations during the stabilize phase. 
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Figure 4.  Phasing Military Operations (from DOD, 2011a, p. V-6). 
Stability activities will be the stabilize-phase main objective with combat 
operations taking a smaller role (DOD, 2011a). “The intent in this phase is to help restore 
local political, economic, and infrastructure stability” (DOD, 2011a, p. V-9). Civil-
military operations are important during this period, and they are intended to secure the 
population and key infrastructure, rebuild, and restore public services (DOD, 2011a). 
Stability-operation activities include providing limited local government and 
humanitarian relief, rebuilding government and institutions infrastructure, restoring 
essential services, supporting economic growth (DOD, 2011a), making peace 
agreements, and restoring, upgrading, and modernizing communication systems and 
infrastructure (DOD, 2011b). In many modern states, these essential services can include 
rebuilding or restoring cyber infrastructure as many states provide medical and 
government services through cyberspace. Economic growth is also reliant on cyberspace. 
Consequently, states must assess the damage to be able conduct the appropriate activities 
during stability operations. 
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B. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT KINETIC VERSUS CYBER 
Damage assessment is a fundamental task of jus post bellum. During an attack 
states are supposed to abide by proportionality to minimize collateral damage and even 
use non-lethal means, if possible, to achieve the desired results and minimize activities 
during stability operations (DOD, 2011b). However, during a conflict, damage to 
infrastructure is inevitable, and states and the international community must assess these 
damages. Since kinetic attacks cause some sort of physical damage, kinetic operations 
facilitate damage assessments due to easily observable effects. A kinetic attack is also 
somewhat deterministic, as the kinetic weapon will have a range of destruction. In 
contrast, the damage caused by a cyberattack is more difficult to assess, in determining 
the number of affected systems, the affected data value, and the effects on untested 
systems and society. There can also be unknown effects for kinetic and cyber weapons, 
such as negative political effects depending on the collateral damage. Still, cyber 
weapons can provide a non-lethal means to achieve the same effect and minimize 
stability operations. 
After the 2003 Iraq War cessation of initial hostilities, Britain and the United 
States expected a 25 to 100 billion dollars cost in reconstruction (Schmickle & Writer, 
2003). The cost would include reconstructing or restoring harbors, railroads, water 
system, electricity, agriculture, and medical services. The immediate efforts would 
include clearing mines from railroads and providing food and medical service to the local 
population. The issues faced by coalition forces and other involved entities are the years 
of infrastructure deterioration prior to the conflict, competing priorities of what is to be 
fixed first, and population impatience over the slow reconstruction process (Schmickle & 
Writer, 2003). The actual cost in Iraq was considerably higher due to the prolonged 
reconstruction process. 
After the 1998 Kosovo War, the United Nations (UN) survey concluded that there 
was significant damage, mostly due to the fleeing Serbian forces’ looting (Kifner, 1999). 
The damage included destruction to two-thirds of housing, schools, health facilities, 
agriculture, and water pollution. The World Bank survey team reported the damage to be 
three to four billion dollars, less than originally expected, to fix minor loss of electricity 
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and infrastructure (Daily Commercial News, 1999). The difficulties of assessing the 
damages were the conflicting damage assessments outcomes and the time it would take to 
accurately assess the damage. Furthermore, there was a lack of coordination between 
aiding organizations, which resulted in duplicate efforts (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2009). 
During the Kosovo War, the U.S. military discussed using a cyberattack. They 
decided against using cyber weapons on the enemy’s air defense systems and civilian 
services in Yugoslavia due to effects uncertainty and issues with abiding by the Law of 
Armed Conflict (Graham, 1999). Likewise, at the beginning of the Iraq War, cyberattacks 
were cancelled due to possible collateral damage (Elliott, 2010). Even though John 
Arquilla confirms there was some use of cyber to deceive Serbian air defense systems 
during the Kosovo War (cited in Elliot, 2010), the limited use of cyber weapons 
highlights the insecurities of using cyber weapons. These decisions also demonstrate that 
the military was already taking into account the consequences of carrying out 
cyberattacks twenty years ago, and calls attention to the challenges cyber operators will 
be facing when assessing cyber weapons risks. 
1. Jus Post Bellum Cost 
As of December 8, 2014, the U.S. Congress has appropriated a total of 815 billion 
dollars for the Iraq War cost and requested 5 billion dollars for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015; 
Congress continues to request funds to facilitate Iraq’s ability to counter terrorist groups, 
as it has not fully transitioned to a peaceful state (Belasco, 2014). These costs include for 
example reconstruction efforts, foreign aid, and the training of Iraqi security forces. As 
Figure 4 shows, all operation phases included planning and actions for stability activities, 
with stability operations taking a bigger role as the operation progresses. Therefore, even 
when hostilities have not completely ended, there are activities including jus post bellum 
actions conducted in an effort to transition to a peaceful state. Table 2 is a depiction of 
the activities and amounts spent over the past 12 years and expected cost for FY2015 to 
transition power to the Iraqi people. The actual cost in Iraq was underestimated because a 
swift transition was expected instead of the prolonged reconstruction process. The Iraq 
War also demonstrated the United States and coalition forces’ commitment to assist a 
 42 
state even after major combat operations were complete and forces withdrawn. This aid is 














Military Operations (i.e., transporting troops, 
buying weapons, and equipment repair), 









Reconstruction, Foreign Aid, and Diplomatic 
Operations (i.e., security, staff salaries, and 
embassies support)  
Veteran Affairs 12.9 3.0 Medical Services for Iraq War Veterans 
Total 814.6 5.0 
 Note: Amounts in billion dollars    
Table 2.   Iraq War Operation Cost (after Belasco, 2014). 
The United States total cost of support efforts for the Kosovo War was 
approximately 6.2 billion dollars; this cost included humanitarian aid, reconstruction 
support, and military operations (Ek, 2000). As a North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) led operation, the majority of reconstruction cost was to be the European 
Nations’ responsibility (Ek, 2000). The United States and allied nations’ war cost and 
activities are portrayed in Table 3. The amounts are those either state provided or pledged 
and reported to the Congressional Research Services (CRS). Therefore, the total 
presented here is an estimate as some states either did not report all assistance value or 
contributed through other channels not listed in the CRS report. The total amount for the 
Kosovo war cost was approximately 11.8 billion dollars. It is important to understand that 
during the Kosovo War there was a clear demarcation on the transition from offensive 
operations to stability operations, which was different from the Iraq War. In addition, the 
Kosovo War emphasized the collective effort required to assist a state’s transition to 




State Cost Activity 
Czech Republic 38.6 
Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian and Refugee 
Assistance 
Denmark 178.3–192.3 
Military and Peacekeeping Operations, Humanitarian and 
Refugee Assistance, and Mine Clearing 
France 634.2 
Military and Peacekeeping Operations, and Humanitarian and 
Refugee Assistance 
Germany 2,107.0 Military Operations and Humanitarian and Refugee Assistance 
Greece 50.0 
Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian and Refugee 
Assistance 
Hungary 21.4 
Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian and Refugee 
Assistance 
Italy 540.5 
Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian and Refugee 
Assistance 
Luxemburg 7.3 Humanitarian Assistance 
Netherlands 107.5 Military and Peacekeeping Operations 
Norway 540.1 
Military and Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian and 
Refugee Assistance 
Poland 14.5 
Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian and Refugee 
Assistance 
Portugal 51.6 
Military and Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian and 
Refugee Assistance 
Spain 89.5 
Military and Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian 
Assistance 
Turkey 70.6 
Military and Peacekeeping Operations and Humanitarian 
Assistance 
United 
Kingdom 181.0 Military Operations and Humanitarian Assistance 
United Nations 939.0 Humanitarian Assistance 
United States 6,215.0 





 Note: Amounts in million dollars DOD     Amounts listed are either contributed amounts or 
pledged amounts at donor   
Table 3.   Kosovo War Cost (after Ek, 2000). 
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The Ponemon Institute 2013 Research Report estimated cyberattacks to cost an 
average of 32,469 dollars per day and require an average of 32 days to address. This 
equates to a cost of over one million dollars per cyberattack. The reference to a 
cyberattack in this report is to criminal activity. However, the cost and response actions 
might be similar when responding to a cyberattack on, say critical infrastructure. 
Moreover, state and non-state actors can use these same criminal cyberattacks as 
offensive warfare weapons. The cost will be different depending on various factors, i.e. 
the time it takes to respond to the attack, the organization size, and the type of attack, 
with organizations experiencing higher malicious code attacks and denial of service being 
the costliest (PI, 2013). The response actions, depicted in Figure 5, include internal 
actions such as detection, recovery, containment, and investigations and external costs, 
such as equipment damage and revenue loss (PI, 2013). This framework can help an 
organization to determine the internal and external cyberattack cost. Additionally, cyber 
defensive actions can minimize the cost of an attack, such as deploying security 
intelligence systems (PI, 2013). 
 
Figure 5.  Cost Framework for Cyber Crime (from PI, 2013). 
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A straight cost comparison between the Iraq and Kosovo Wars versus a 
cyberattack cannot provide an accurate estimate of cost savings due to the cause and 
effects of a kinetic attack versus a cyberattack. But the comparison can encourage the use 
of a tested ethical cyber weapon that can have the intended effects instead of a kinetic 
attack that can cause more destruction and possible loss of life. However, cyberattacks 
require further considerations, such as that various cyberattacks already out in the wild 
can be manipulated and used against any target, states are developing cyberattacks that 
can have more detrimental effects, and a state can paralyze a technological state without 
even stepping foot on the attacked state. As an example, as more industrial systems 
increase their target area by connecting to the Internet, states will be able to target these 
systems without having physical access to the facilities, which can result in loss of life 
effects. Therefore, the international community should seek to protect populations and 
attempt to control cyber weapons.  
2. Entities Involved in Reconstructions 
Many entities are involved during transitions from war-to-peace. These 
organizations aim to end suffering and aid states to recover and flourish after an armed 
conflict. “No single actor can meet the challenges of peace-building and reconstruction 
by itself. Cooperation and coherence are key factors in successful international peace-
building operations” (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2009, p. 31). The number of entities involved 
points to the necessity of having a collective effort to ensure success during jus post 
bellum.  
a. 2003 Iraq War 
In addition to providing UN resolutions after a conflict, the UN agencies involved 
before the Iraq War and continuing to help the Iraqi people were:  
• The Office of the Iraq Programme Oil-for-Food, which helped a 
sanctioned Iraq sell oil to meet Iraqi humanitarian needs (Coipuram, 
2003). 
• The Mine Action Programme for Northern Iraq, which finds and clears 
mines, educates the population, and rehabilitates victims (Coipuram, 
2003). 
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• The UN Children’s Fund, which protects children during the war 
(Coipuram, 2013). 
• The UN Development Programme, which battles poverty (Coipuram, 
2003). 
• The World Food Programme, which battles hunger (Coipuram, 2003). 
• The World Health Organization, which provides health assistance 
(Coipuram, 2013). 
• The UN Environment Program, which provides education and 
environmental recovery (Coipuram, 2003).  
• The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, which protects refugees 
(Coipuram, 2003). 
• The UN Food and Agriculture Organization, which identifies machinery 
needs and provides fuel and assistance to begin agriculture (Schmickle & 
Writer, 2003). 
The U.S. agencies that supported or continued to assist Iraq’s post-conflict 
recovery were: 
• The U.S. Agency for International Development and Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for reconstruction efforts 
(Schmickle & Writer, 2003).  
• The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance for humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance (Schmickle & Writer, 2003).  
• The U.S. Navy Engineers for harbor repair (Schmickle & Writer, 2003).  
Other nongovernmental organizations involved in Iraq include: 
• The International Committee of the Red Cross, which protects war victims 
(Coipuram, 2003). 
• The Human Rights Watch, which protects human rights (Coipuram, 2003). 
• The Oxfam International, which battles injustice, poverty, and misery 
(Coipuram, 2003).  
These lists do not include other states and coalition partners that helped in the 
reconstruction efforts and provided humanitarian assistance, such as Spain, Britain, and 
Kuwait (Schmickle & Writer, 2003). 
b. 1998 Kosovo War 
In addition to the states listed in Table 3 that provided humanitarian aid, refugee 
assistance, and military and peacekeeping operations support, the World Bank and the 
UN helped to conduct Kosovars needs surveys, such as assessing destroyed homes and 
infrastructure, medical needs, and electricity requirements (Daily Commercial News, 
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1999). During or after the Kosovo War, the UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo was in charge of setting up an interim government; the UN High Commission for 
Refugees Agency provided humanitarian assistance; the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe was to provide “democratization and institution-building”, the 
European Union (EU) was to aid in reconstruction and economic development; and 
NATO would provide “military protection” (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2009). All these 
organization were trying to help Kosovo establish enduring peace.  
C. INTERNATIONAL CYBER ORGANIZATIONS 
International coordinated efforts can make a transition from conflict-to-peace 
easier. There are already established international organizations that can aid states during 
a cyber conflict, which benefits cyberspace. These international organizations include the 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs), the Forum of Incident Response and 
Security Teams (FIRST), the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence 
(CCDCOE), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Summit on 
the Information Society (WSIS), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA), and the International Multilateral Partnership against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) 
and have the following responsibilities (Ferwerda, Choucri, & Madnick, 2010).  
CERTs: These cyber centers’ principal charter is to ensure network availability. 
They do it through responding to emergencies and advancing security tools. Currently 
there are 200 centers with various levels of expertise and structure. These centers began 
as non-profit organizations, but many are public-private trusts. Essentially, they find and 
report cyber vulnerabilities, advance a holistic threat understanding, respond to threats, 
and encourage communication between security vendors, users, and private 
organizations.  
FIRST: This body advances information sharing between security organizations 
and incorporates CERTs at various levels. 
CCDDOE: This NATO cyber organization is responsible for educating, training, 
and responding to cyberattacks against NATO members. Although not all NATO 
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members are part of CCDDOE, it can support less technologically advanced members to 
deal with cyberattacks.  
ITU: This is an international body that enhances understanding of legislation, 
botnets, and CERTS, provides tools for organizations to conduct self-assessments and 
threat response, promotes cyber education, and promotes cyber security cooperation.  
WSIS and OECD: These world conferences on cyber security bridge the gap 
between various parties, such as academia, government, and security professionals and 
promote information sharing. OECD also publishes conference papers, guidelines, and 
best practices. 
ENISA: The EU established this body to improve their ability to deal with and 
respond to cyber issues. ENISA focuses on cyber education, promoting best practices, 
and works with regional CERTs.  
IMPACT: This is an ITU-sponsored international body. IMPACT responds to 
threats, conducts data analytics, maintains a research center, and provides real-time 
warnings to UN member states and defense resources.  
 
Figure 6.  Key Intergovernmental Institutions (from Ferwerda et al., 2010). 
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In developed states such as the United States. there are national cyber 
organizations. However, even the White House feels that the government is not structured 
to respond to the increasing cyber threats (cited in Ferwerda et al., 2010). Even though 
cooperation between these organizations has been increasing, they also believe it is not 
sufficient. The relationships between the different cyber organizations are shown in 
Figure 6, and also highlights that there is still more work to do on ensuring links are 
established between the organizations. The international community can benefit from 
open communication between all these organizations and collective cyber response 
because states will be better prepared for future cyberattacks, will have a holistic 
understanding of the threat, will further cyber education; and can establish solutions for 
known cyberattacks.   
D. CONCLUSION 
The following observations can be made of the differences between kinetic and 
cyber conflict.  
Observation 1: It can be difficult to correctly assess damages for kinetic and 
cyberattacks if many entities are involved. Still, the ability to observe a kinetic attack’s 
physical effects makes it easier to determine the damage. For a cyberattack, for instance, 
a deployed computer virus can continue to infect systems even after the cessation of 
hostilities similar to landmines that continue to claim innocent victims and prevent 
reconstruction efforts post-conflict (U.S. Department of State, 1994). There are 
agreements regarding the use of mines because of their indiscriminate nature and 
lingering effects (ICRC, 2014); analogous agreements are lacking for cyberspace. In 
addition, the cyber reconstruction effort might not even need personnel in the affected 
state, if say reversible attacks are used. 
Observation 2: Kinetic attacks have effects that may not be feasible with a cyber-
weapon. Therefore, states cannot substitute one for the other. Even so, the greater a 
state’s Internet footprint, the greater an adversary’s ability to paralyze that state. For 
example, in Estonia, there are over 150 e-public services, 95% of Estonians do online 
banking, and 98% of Estonians have Internet access (Kaska et al., 2010). This big 
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Internet footprint allowed attackers in 2007 to cause more economic damage than was 
possible in a poorly networked country. 
Observation 3: Kinetic attack attribution is usually not an issue because the 
warring parties are known. By contrast, attribution becomes a difficult, albeit not 
impossible, task in cyberspace due to plausible deniability. States and organizations can 
establish some type of cyberattack attribution through forensic analysis and intelligence 
gathering. Nevertheless, the international community can make attribution easier through 
agreements and investigations. 
Observation 4: In the same way that defeated states or states facing internal 
turmoil need international aid to recover after the conflict, states lacking the technical 
ability to respond to major cyberattacks will need international help due to the level of 
expertise required to respond to cyberattacks. The established international, regional, and 
national cyber centers are helping to bridge this gap, but more cooperation is needed 
between these bodies.  
Observation 5: A long list of established organizations support states during the 
aftermath of kinetic wars, whereas cyber organizations that provide assistance in the fight 
against malicious cyber actors are few and still developing. 
Observation 6: Cost alone cannot be the determinant to use a kinetic attack over 
a cyberattack and vice versa, as there are other factors to consider such as desired effects 
and weapon ethicality. 
Post-conflict activities are important if the international community seeks to 
establish long-lasting peace. Actors cannot plan for everything, but having transition and 
exit plans before conducting stability actions can make the transition smoother. Victors 
and defeated are integral part of the recovery and reconstruction effort regardless of who 
was the aggressor. If international organizations do not get involved, they may be 
enabling perpetual conflict, as some states do not have the capabilities to recover from a 
war. For example, the international community came together to help during the Kosovo 
and Iraq recovery periods, though most did not contribute to the destruction. In addition, 
a collective effort is more effective as demonstrated by the international effort in the two 
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wars. The cooperation will require open lines of communication and a coordinated effort 
to limit duplicate efforts (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2009), which will aid in setting priorities, 




V. CASE STUDY: NORTH KOREAN CYBERATTACKS 
As a minimal requirement, victors must return to the fields of battle and 
help remove the instruments of war. As a maximal requirement, victors 
must assist in the repair of the social infrastructure. Proscribed by such a 
principle would be of the vanquished and disregard of the fact that, for 
many innocent victims, the war continues after surrender. (Schuck, 1994, 
p. 982). 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Accessing or breaking into systems with a malicious intent violates established 
computer laws, such as the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Locating and stopping 
international computer crime continues to improve with the Council of Europe 
Cybercrime Treaty, although only 42 states have ratified it (CoE, 2014). Additionally, 
state governments can be involved in similar or more devastating attacks against another 
state’s public or private sector, what we refer to as cyber-warfare. This raises ethical and 
moral issues on the proper procedures when dealing with government-sponsored 
cyberattacks after the fact, mainly adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), 
customary international law, jus post bellum theory, the cost associated with restoration 
and dealing with these types of attacks, and the possible inability to contain the 
cyberattacks to only military objectives.  
It is helpful to examine a case study. In the context of state-on-state cyberattacks, 
this case study’s objective is to place into perspective the actions the attacked state and 
the international community can take during the aftermath of a state-sponsored 
cyberattack. Proper actions during the aftermath of a cyberattack are important to ensure 
aggressors abide by just-war theory, IHL, to maintain the peace and allow for just 
reparations. This case study will include steps taken after the attack and considerations 
for the start of investigations, possible emergency response organization actions, cost 
associated with the attacks, assignment of state responsibility, and use of international 
organizations intervention to settle the dispute. In view of the few cyber-warfare-specific 
laws, customary international law can apply to cyberspace, especially to the increased 
possibility of collateral damage in cyberspace. The assumption should be that 
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cyberattacks are “subject to IHL just as any new weapon or delivery system has been so 
far when used in an armed conflict” (Dörmann, 2001). Moreover, the Additional Protocol 
I to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1977), Article 36, stresses the responsibility 
of states to ensure any new weapon deployment abides by international law. Therefore, 
the international community needs to hold state governments accountable for the 
destruction due to cyber operations by supporting victim states during the conduct of 
investigations, establishing attribution, and enforcing international laws.    
B. NORTH KOREA 
Relatively little is known about Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s 
(DPRK) intentions. Nevertheless, one of the recognized goals of North Korea is to 
continue pursuing the union of the Koreas while maintaining control (Maxwell, 2013). 
The alliance of the United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) is standing in the way of 
this goal; therefore, severing the United States and ROK alliance is important to the 
DPRK to allow for reunification (Maxwell, 2013). The ROK reported that from 1953 to 
2011, the DPRK violated the armistice 221 times, conducted 26 military attacks, and 
continues escalating their actions (Hae-in, 2011). These physical actions could be an 
attempt to continue attacking the United States and ROK alliance, and to demonstrate to 
the ROK that they still have the power and resolution to cause damage. If the United 
States removed ROK support, the DPRK will have a greater likelihood of winning during 
an altercation with the ROK and re-unifying the Koreas.  
The small amount of information from DPRK may be because North Korea 
highly controls the information that comes out to the world; they even designed their own 
intranet and operating system (OS) to contain the information their citizens can access 
and that circulates out of their borders. The DPRK government restricts access to 
information and websites through their home-built intranet and “Red Star” OS, which is 
mostly available for government, universities, and government-run institutions (Ventre, 
2011). According to the Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (2014), DPRK has 
been assigned the Internet Protocol (IP) range 175.45.176.0 - 175.45.179.255 and 
Autonomous System (AS) 131279 managed by Star Joint Venture Internet Service 
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Provider Company. According to Robtext.com, AS 131279 is directly connected to 
China’s AS 4837. DPRK uses Chinese servers to host and broadcast information and only 
a few identified personnel have access to the Internet (Ventre, 2011). North Korea’s 
Internet connections and IP addresses are depicted in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  North Korea Internet Footprint (after APNIC, 2014). 
The international community views North Korea as a underdeveloped state that is 
barely surviving with continuous humanitarian aid to provide them with food (Worden, 
2008). This is not the case with their military. Their military continuously studies their 
adversaries’ tactics to take full advantage of the enemy’s weaknesses and capitalize on 
their strengths (Sang-ho, 2014a). Their military-first mentality and technology-forward 
attitude makes it unsurprising that they have and continue to develop their cyber 
capabilities. Since 2000, their late dictator Kim Jong II was advocating technological 
advances; he stated that there were three types of fools, one of them being computer 
illiterate people (Zemlianichenko, 2003). However, North Korea began developing its 
cyber capabilities since 1986 with the Pyongyang Informatics Center (Brown, 2004) and 
in the 1990’s they established the Korean Computer Center (Carr, 2011). They have at 
least four units (Clarke & Knake, 2010) with anywhere between 100–12,000 members 
and a budget of 56 million dollars. The outcome of a 2005 South Korean simulation was 
that North Korea had the capability to cripple the U.S. Pacific Command and they were 
eighth in a cyber-threat ranking (Ventre, 2011). A listing of likely North Korean cyber 
organizations is given in Table 4. Additionally, analysts think that North Korea has cyber 
warriors stationed in other states that can carry out cyberattacks from there, states such as 
Japan and China (Carr, 2011; Clarke & Knake, 2010). This indicates that North-Korea-
directed attacks could be originating from military members stationed overseas.  
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 Organization Duty 
Reconnaissance General Bureau Command and control 
   Unit 35: Investigation Room Investigation department, social and economic hacking 
   Office 91 Core hacking tasks 
   Unit 110 Reconnaissance team 
   Unit 121 Guidance unit, infiltration, spread of viruses 
   Office 3132 Electronic psychological warfare 
Command Automation Department Command and control 
   Office 31 Developing hacking programs 
   Office 32 Developing military-related software programs 
   Office 56 Developing programs for command and control 
Enemy Disintegration Department Command and control 
   Unit 204 Cyber psychological operations against enemy military 
Academic Institutions   
   Command Automation University Teaching focused on hacking 
   Kim Chaek University of Technology 
10 research institutes and 54 laboratories, developed 
various software for artificial intelligence, extensive 
computer-science curriculum, developed various 
antivirus products 
   Kim IL-Sung Military University 10 institutes including electronic computers, cell engineering, and atomic energy 
   Mirim University Trains top students in information technology and cyber warfare 
   Moranbong University Develops hacking experts 
   Pyongyang University of Computer  
   Technology 
A three-year university for computer and information 
technology  
 
Table 4.   North Korea Cyber Elements (after Brown, 2004; Clarke & Knake, 
2010; Sang-Ho, 2014a). 
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In North Korea the division between the government and the private sector does 
not exist. The North Korean constitution clearly states that all organizations are state 
owned, such as banks, enterprises, major factories, communications, and education is 
state provided (Worden, 2008). Their technology research institutions work closely with 
their military to develop their cyber capabilities. They have seven technology research 
lab centers and academic institutions focused on cyber development (Brown, 2004). 
Libicki has also assessed DPRK cyber-warfare skills to parallel Iran’s (cited in Sang-ho, 
2014b). South Koreans believe North Korea has been gathering intelligence about 
computer systems and critical infrastructure in South Korea and has planned the best 
attack vector for each network infrastructure (Strategy Page, 2011). Considering all this 
information, it appears that the DPRK is a very capable cyber opponent as well as having 
knowledge of South Korea’s cyber infrastructure. It is important to note that a DPRK-
initiated cyberattack may not necessarily originate from DPRK territory due to the ease 
of spoofing and Internet North Korean cyber personnel out of the state (Sang-ho, 2014b).  
C. NORTH-KOREA SUSPECTED CYBERATTACKS 
It is important to establish attack vectors and a timeline of cyberattacks likely 
perpetrated by North Korea. South Korea has accused North Korea, as early as 2004, of 
being the perpetrator of various cyberattacks. All these cyberattacks were mostly against 
South Korean government, but they have also targeted civilian organizations, and 
coincided with political events such as the U.S. Independence day, ROK and U.S. 
exercises, and the Korean War anniversary. Either North Korea is the perpetrator or 
another state or non-state actor is timing their attacks to make it seem as if North Korea 
was committing these cyberattacks. When assessing North Korea’s involvement, we have 
to take into account the motivation of the state involved; in this case, North Korea has 
been aggressive about taking actions against the South for anything they view as anti-
DPRK. Also, North Korea has both the capability and skill to do cyberattacks. The 
following cyberattacks are noteworthy: 
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1. July 2004 
Over 270 South Korean government computers such as the Korea Atomic Energy 
were infected with a malware virus that could perform data exfiltration including 
passwords (Brockman-Hawe, 2007). According to Brockman-Hawe, the South Korea 
National Intelligence Center (NIS) declared this a North-Korea-conducted attack,  
whereas Brown (2004) stated that the NIS identified Chinese hackers as the perpetrators. 
However, it would not be out of the question for North Korea to buy viruses from 
Chinese hackers. 
2. August/September 2005 
South Korea announced the discovery of North Korea’s intrusion of 33 military 
communications sites during the annual Ulchi-Focus Lens Exercise with the United 
States (Ventre, 2011). Every year, North Korea condemns this exercise as preparation for 
attacks against the North and issues statements about conducting their own preemptive 
attacks or retaliation if the exercise goes on (Panda, 2014). 
3. July 2006 
According to Ventre (2011), North Korea, specifically Unit 121, breached and 
damaged South Korean and U.S. Department of Defense servers. 
4. October 2007 
North Korea apparently tested a ‘logic bomb’ cyber-weapon, and consequently 
the United Nations (UN) Security Council issued a resolution to ban computer imports to 
North Korea (Ventre, 2011). A logic bomb is an event-driven or time-driven piece of 
malware that will deploy once it is triggered (Schmitt, 2013). The UN sanctions were to 
prevent North Korea from obtaining the hardware and software to continue developing 
cyber weapons.  
5. September 2008 
South Korea accused North Korea of sending emails to their military that 
contained Trojan horses (Ventre, 2011). Spear-phishing emails also targeted senior 
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officials with names apparently provided by a previous North Korean defector suspected 
of still working for the North (Leyden, 2008).  
6. March 2009 
North Korea was alleged to have stolen over 1,000 documents about hazardous 
material that contained secret information from the National Institute of Environmental 
Research, through an infected document transmitted via email (Ventre, 2011). It took 
seven months for South Korea to discover the implanted code on a computer belonging to 
a South Korean officer (Clarke & Knake, 2010). After initial penetration, the attackers 
obtained a password to access the South Korean Chemical Accidents and Response 
Information System to steal data (Raska, 2013). The long period until discovery increased 
the value of the data lost, the cost of responding to the attack, and the ability to assess the 
damages correctly. 
7. July 2009 
A distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attack was conducted against 35 South 
Korean and U.S. government websites (Sang-ho, 2014a). The attack was conducted using 
botnets to send traffic to a targeted website list (Vlahos, 2014; Clarke & Knake, 2010). 
The NIS determined North Korean involvement, specifically Unit 110, because of the 
timing and sophistication of the attack (Clarke & Knake, 2010). The bot computers were 
found in 74 states, the masters in eight states, and the command and control in England 
(Clarke & Knake, 2010). Furthermore, there is evidence that the code was targeting the 
Korean language (Carr, 2011). Ventre (2011) judged the objective of this attack to be to 
test South Korea and U.S. resilience against this type of cyberattack. 
8. November 2009 
North Korea was accused of stealing a plan that specified U.S. and South Korea 
strategy in case of a war with North Korea (Ventre, 2011). A South Korean officer 
initiated the attack when he used an infected universal serial bus drive and switched 
between classified networks and the Internet (Raska, 2013). Clarke & Knake state that 
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the use of the Korean character set was discovered. North Korea is interested in war 
plans, which would give them the military advantage. 
9. January, March, and October 2010 
More cases throughout 2010 of data exfiltration attacks involved targeting South 
Korean officers with malware. The targets included the South Korean Ministry of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs offices, and some of the documents stolen included 
information on China and North Korea relationship (Ventre, 2011). Aggressors used 
phishing attacks to set up an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) and continued access to 
South Korean networks to conduct data exfiltration, while remaining undetected. An APT 
is a constant link between the attackers and the target to gather and extract information, 
install additional malware, or disrupt operations (Symantec, 1995). 
10. March 2011 
A DDoS attack was conducted against South Korean banks through botnets. 
McAfee Labs assessed the attack as having North Korean signature, and the attack was 
similar to the 2009 attacks (Vlahos, 2014). McAfee (2011) discovered the use of Korean 
character sets in a white paper assessment of what they called “Ten Days of Rain.” 
McAfee discovered that the code was similar, but more sophisticated, than the 2009 
attacks, that it had a set timeframe for the attacks (10 days), contained a target list, 
deleted and overwrote files, and was set to damage the bot’s master boot record (MBR) 
after completion of the attack. This type of attack requires the OS, applications, and data 
to be rebuilt. As Carr (2011) has argued, if these were cyber criminals, they will want to 
continue using the bots instead of destroying them. Since these were nation-state actors 
that destroyed another state’s systems and data, either the aggressor state or the 
individuals involved could be held accountable under international laws.   
11. June 2012 
A South Korea citizen was arrested for selling infected online games that 
contained a virus to convert computers into bots once the game was played (Chul-jae & 
Gwang-lip, 2012). There were over 100,000 games run and the South Korean 
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government was investigating a ROK citizen for suspicion of working with North Korea 
(Chul-jae & Gwang-lip, 2012). Chul-jae and Gwang-lip reported that the NIS had linked 
the ROK citizen to the DPRK’s Reconnaissance General Bureau. This could be one of 
the links between North Korea and the attacks against South Korea, by indicating that 
North Korea may have been controlling the South Korean bots. 
12. June 2012 
South Korean officials said North Korea was involved in the hacking and 
disabling of a South Korean newspaper (Lee, 2013). The JoonhAng Ilbo was targeted and 
their databases containing articles and photos were deleted (Myo-ja & Tae-hee, 2012). 
North Korea had previously threatened seven South Korean media organizations for their 
coverage of a Pyongyang event (Myo-ja & Tae-hee, 2012). The perpetrator attacked the 
server through an employee website (Myo-ja & Tae-hee, 2012). This is another instance 
of North Korea indiscriminately targeting a civilian organization. 
13. March 2013 
South Korean banks’ and broadcasting firms’ computers systems were wiped 
completely by embedded malware (Sang-ho, 2014a). The attack was planned for eight 
months, perpetrated through an email attachment, and was said to involve six computers 
with North Korean IP addresses (Gallagher, 2013). The IP address 175.45.178.xx was 
observed during a brief moment (Kwang-tae, 2013); this IP address belongs to North 
Korea as depicted on Figure 7. Furthermore, Kim Seung-joo assessed that this was not 
only credible since it was an accidental IP exposure, but also suggests that North Korea is 
also the culprit in previous attacks (Kwang-tae, 2013). However, Vlahos (2014) claims 
that even though South Korea blamed North Korea, specialists discovered over 1,000 IP 
addresses located in different states. Nonetheless, the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) (2014) has also announced North Korea as the perpetrator of this 
attack. This type of attack is another case of specifically targeting civilian organizations. 
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14. June 2013 
A DDoS attack was conducted against South Korean government and commercial 
websites (Sang-hun, 2013). However, hackers apparently also targeted North Korea 
(Sang-hun, 2013). The South Korean investigators found similarities to the code used in 
March 2011 and concluded North Korea involvement by analyzing the code, IP addresses 
used, and linked to the significant Korean War anniversary date (Sang-hun, 2013). 
Investigators also assessed that the attackers planned the attack for months due to 
discovering the weak access points into the targets (Sang-hun, 2013).  
15. November 2014 
An attack was made against Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE) in November 
2014. SPE and movie theaters were threatened to stop movie distribution (FBI, 2014) of a 
satirical movie with the plot to murder the North Korean leader (FoxNews.com, 2015). 
This attack met its objective as it coerced SPE and movie theaters not to distribute the 
movie.  The FBI attributed the attack to North Korea (FBI, 2014). SPE provided the FBI 
with “raw data” of the attack (FoxNews.com, 2015). The FBI took steps to establish 
attribution by correlating previously used signatures, algorithms, and IP addresses linked 
to North Korea. The FBI concluded that the cyberattack was destructive malware and that 
data theft included “proprietary information as well as employees’ personally identifiable 
information and confidential communications” (FBI, 2014). FoxNews.com (2014) 
reported that the cyberattack disclosed private information, disrupted SPE, and destroyed 
data. The FBI added that “the attacks also rendered thousands of SPE’s computers 
inoperable, forced SPE to take its entire computer network offline, and significantly 
disrupted the company’s business operations.” 
Experts have estimated the damages of this cyberattack were from 70 million to 
100 million dollars, and the cost includes investigations and computer repair and 
replacement (Richwine, 2014). A SPE executive lost her job due to damaging emails that 
were disclosed (Rushe, 2015). Additionally, the cyberattack damaged SPE’s reputation 
and working relationships, and this could be worse than the financial damage. Intangible 
damage can be hard to measure. SPE has cyber insurance which will offset some of the 
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cost; however, it can take up to six months to fully account for the damage of this 
cyberattack (Richwine, 2014). SPE reported that because of their cyber insurance, the 
attack only cost them 15 million dollars (Rushe, 2015). Richwine reports that SPE has an 
operating budget of over 500 million dollars, so the attack might not be significant for 
them. This would not be the case for organizations that have smaller budgets and can be 
placed out of business with a single cyberattack. This cyberattack makes a case for 
“cyber insurance”; but more importantly, it illustrates that nation-states can leverage 
cyberspace as a coercion tool to mandate actions from any entity, continue to target 
civilian organizations, and attack liberties afforded by a state such as privacy and 
freedom of speech. This attack is of particular importance because it showed that 
attribution could be established through malware authorship and attack origin. Even if 
this particular cyberattack is not considered an act of war, a nation-state targeted a 
civilian organization, which is a clear violation of international laws.  
D. ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACKS 
Experts have looked at the similarities and differences of the most recent attacks 
against South Korea to determine code provenance and possible perpetrators. Seo, Won, 
and Hong (2011) analyzed the DDoS attacks against South Korea in July 2009 and in 
March 2011 by inspecting traffic initiated from infected systems during both of these 
incidents from the Pohang University of Science and Technology (POSTECH). The 
researchers assumed the malware had corrupted POSTECH systems, collected outgoing 
traffic during the attacks, and only analyzed suspicious traffic. They found the following 
similarities between the two incidents: (1) the attacks were autonomous with a predefined 
target list and start date and time; (2) they used botnets with low-rate (54.2kbs) attacks to 
remain undetected on the infected hosts; (3) they used multiple forms of DDoS attacks 
(TCP SYN floods, ICMP floods, UDP floods, and HTTP GET/POST flood); and (4) the 
bots included instructions to delete documents and corrupt the MBR. They discovered 
more sophistication in the March 2011 attack with the command and control used for 
modifying malware code to avoid newly implemented signatures. The malware also 
prevented the host antivirus software from receiving any antivirus updates, they 
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encrypted communications to make analysis difficult, and the termination of the attacks 
could only be achieved through disabling the bot. 
The U.S.-Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) (2013) published 
analysis of the March 2013 attacks through code evaluation; they determined the code 
was designed to avoid South Korean antivirus signatures. According to the U.S.-CERT, 
the malware was targeting South Korea, it was designed to affect multiple operating 
systems, corrupt the MBR, delete files, and included specific dates and times for the 
attacks to commence. The U.S.-CERT assessed the code to be unsophisticated but still 
capable of causing high damage. The characteristics of this attack are very similar to the 
characteristics described by Seo et al., which points to the same attacker for all three 
events. FireEye analysts corroborate the U.S.-CERT assessments for this particular attack 
(Pidathala, Khalid, Singh, & Vashisht, 2013) and provide more in-depth analysis of the 
malware code. FireEye analysts indicate that after enumerating the system’s files, the 
attackers replaced them with the Roman army words “Hastati” and “Princpes” and 
corrupted the MBR to make it unusable (Pidathala et al., 2013). The malware would also 
disable the South Korean antivirus by issuing a taskkill command for AhnLab software, 
produced by a popular South Korean antivirus software organization, and the malware 
would check the time to commence the attack at the specified time (Pidathala et al., 
2013). 
Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) also analyzed the wiper malware 
used during the March 2013 attacks against South Korea. In addition to the same 
discoveries made by FireEye analysts, the CTU found that the dropper code was not 
designed to propagate, but was to be dropped by another program, which could have been 
over HTTP as there was an increase of executable HTTP downloaded traffic a month 
before the attacks from the published IP addresses as shown on Figure 8 (Dell 
SecureWorks, 2013). This attack vector is particularly important as FireEye points to a 
North Korea modus operandi in their World War C report, which consists of hacking 
websites with malware to take over their OS and where malware is downloaded to disable 
their antivirus (Geers et al., 2013). AhnLab Security also found the malware code would 
generate new files that included script to destroy the systems’ disk and MBR for the 
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attacks conducted on March 2013 (AhnLab, 2013). The malicious code would overwrite 
the /kernel, /usr, /etc, and /home directories with zeroes for Linux systems and for the 
windows systems physical drives 0–9 would be overwritten with PRINCPES (AhnLab, 
2013). Additionally, AhnLab reported the malware code was polymorphic to continue 
evading detection such as changing the string “PRINCPES to “PR!NCPES” (AhnLab, 
2013).  
 
Figure 8.  Timeline of executable file download events over HTTP  
(from Dell SecureWorks, 2013). 
McAfee assessed that the same group has been behind all the cyberattacks against 
South Korea since 2009. They believe the group’s objective was espionage since the 
attacks only looked for military specific data before extraction; even though they could 
destroy the systems’ boot loader since 2009, it was only used during the March 20, 2013 
attacks (Sherstobitoff & Liba, 2013). Sherstobitoff and Liba concluded these attacks to be 
related because it is mostly the same code event using the same password for the zip files, 
with some added functionality over time such as being able to extract files in the later 
versions. Sherstobitoff and Liba also point that these attacks could have been perpetrated 
by the New Romanic Army Cyber Team because of their use of ancient Roman military 
terms; however, North Korea could also be using those strings to introduce doubt as to 
who the real perpetrators are. Symantec has also linked cyberattacks against South Korea 
since 2009 to include the June 2013 attack (Figure 9), and assessed the gang Dark Seoul 
as the perpetrators with financial and political support, intelligence and coordination, and 
some level of sophistication (Symantec, 2013).  
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Figure 9.  Four years of Dark Soul (from Symantec, 2013). 
It is evident that South Korea has been the target of these attacks because the 
attacks are not only pre-configured to run on historical dates, but they are designed to 
evade specific South Korean antivirus software, and the target list consists mainly of 
South Korean organizations and target military terms. The autonomous attacks prolonged 
the attacks and prevented South Korea from responding to the incidents quickly because 
it meant that every bot had to be stopped for the attacks to stop, which increased the cost 
associated with these attacks. Autonomous attacks also point to North Korea because 
they need to use attacks that do not require much command-and-control to execute 
because of their limited Internet connections. Most of the infected bots were in South 
Korea (Seo et al., 2011), which can also point to North Korea’s involvement, as they 
have been involved in attempting to grow botnets in South Korea through methods such 
as infected games, phishing attacks, and HTTP executables. Carr (2011) also discusses a 
theory of cybercriminal involvement in creating the botnets, but the code’s self-
destruction characteristics made it unlikely because cybercriminals like to maintain 
control for future use instead of releasing the bots after a particular attack. The code also 
contained instructions to find specific military files for extraction, and these files were of 
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special interest to North Korea. Moreover, the highlighted increased level of malware 
sophistication and added functions with each attack are expected improvements for 
organized military cyber units that continue developing their skills.  
E. ANALYSIS  
South Korea is one of the most technologically advanced states in the world with 
a National Cyber Security Center, cyberwar unit, and 177 cyber training centers (Ventre, 
2011). South Korea is also a member of the Asian Pacific-CERT (AP-CERT), which can 
provide emergency response aid (APCERT, 2005). South Korea is particularly 
susceptible to cyberattacks due to its Internet footprint; almost 85% of its population has 
an Internet connection as shown on Table 5. This means that releasing an untargeted 
cyberattack against South Korea’s networks has a high percentage for collateral damage, 
or in other words, an attacker can expect the damage to the private sector to be extensive. 
The challenge of discrimination during a cyberattack is compounded by both military and 
civilian organizations using the same types of software and hardware, which makes 
targeted weapon deployment more difficult. Additionally, North Korea most likely 
cannot develop a carefully targeted cyberattack consistent with the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC), since they have repeatedly targeted civilian organizations during 
previous attacks.  









DPRK % Pop 
Internet Users 
2001 47,177,811 26,702,641 56.60% 22,977,355 0 
2003 47,656,631 31,215,093 65.50% 23,330,469 0 
2005 48,005,157 35,283,790 73.50% 23,620,923 0 
2007 48,250,148 38,021,116 78.80% 23,907,668 0 
2009 48,508,972 39,583,321 81.60% 24,190,924 0 
2011 48,754,657 40,836,900 83.76% 24,457,492 0 
2013 48,955,203 41,499,325 84.77% 24,720,407 0 
 
Table 5.   Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet-South Korea versus  
North Korea (after ITU, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). 
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1. Damage Costs 
It is safe to assume that the ROK can respond to cyberattacks with AP-CERT aid. 
Nevertheless, the cost for South Korea to assess the damage and impact of cyberattacks, 
rebuild affected systems, restore backup data, and conduct an investigation is significant. 
Hern (2013) reported that the cyberattacks against South Korea cost approximately 780 
million dollars in 2013, 9 million dollars in 2011, and 49 million dollars in 2009. Another 
researcher (Park, 2010) used a different model to estimate the damage of these 
cyberattacks. His model calculated the damaged per organization instead of whole cost, 
and includes acquisition cost of any asset required to resolve the attack, operations cost, 
business-opportunity cost, and indirect cost in respect to any entity classification. He 
assess the cost for one agency with a 24 hour downtime to be over 380 thousand dollars. 
He also listed cost for the July 2004 cyberattacks against South Korea to be between 95 
million and 1.5 billion dollars, and the July 2009 cyberattacks to between 32 and 50 
million dollars. 
South Korea conducted similar steps to find out the total cost of the many attacks 
they have endured. For example to assess one aspect of direct damage, South Korea had 
to scan all networks to find affected systems, determine vulnerabilities, contain the 
attacks, patch systems, and notify antivirus organizations to prevent further damage, 
which has to be performed by specialists. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology notes that it can take several months to recover from significant cyberattacks 
(Cichonski, Millar, Grance, & Scarfone, 2012), adding to the overall cost of the attack. 
This recovery time can be devastating to an organization.  
2. Establishing Attribution 
The ability to use systems around the world complicates attribution, but it is not 
impossible. Attribution can be achieved through a combination of technical steps and 
recognition of significant political, historical, or other types of events. Attribution is 
necessary to request international aid with prosecution, recovery, and for compensation 
after a cyberattack occurs. Then forensic analysis will attempt to ascertain the possible 
attacker by establishing the attack vector, following the traversal path to the attack origin, 
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and analyzing malware provenance by determining if the malware resembles other 
malicious code previously attributed to a state. The characteristics discovered and 
published by various researchers on the different attacks against South Korea strongly 
suggest that these attacks are related. Additionally, origin IP addresses linked to North 
Korea were discovered in previous attacks. 
North Korea also has motivation to continue attacking South Korea through 
cyberspace.  North Korea has conducted conventional attacks since the 1950’s (Hae-in, 
2011) to break United States and ROK ties and reunify the Koreas (Maxwell, 2013). The 
war between North and South Korea has never officially ended, and cyberspace has 
provided North Korea with another avenue of approach to keep harassing the South at a 
relatively low cost. North Korea will lose if a kinetic war were to occur because of 
support by U.S. military power. In cyberspace, North Korea can continue to attack South 
Korea’s financial institutions, private organizations, and military without having to use 
many resources and with the ability to hide behind plausible deniability (Sang-ho, 
2014a).  Furthermore, no one has held North Korea responsible for the past attacks so 
they have no fear of reprisal. 
Even with all these facts, we must also consider if other states might be the 
culprits of the attacks on South Korea. What would another state gain by making North 
Korea seem as the perpetrator of the attack or by assisting them? Other states that might 
be able to conduct these types of cyberattacks are China and Russia; they are aware of the 
strong partnership between South Korea and the United States and may not want to attack 
the United States directly. Even if China is not the culprit, it might be at least an abettor, 
as North Korea’s Internet connections are routed through China as reflected in Figure 7 
(APINIC, 2014).  So, it is possible that China could be responsible for the attacks or 
abetting North Korea in retaliation for the United States’ current lawsuit against the five 
officers of Unit 61398 who conducted cyberespionage against U.S. organizations (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2014). It could also be Russia in an attempt to keep the United 
States occupied in another part of the world and give them freedom of maneuver in 
Europe. If South Korea traced the attacks to either of these states, these states would 
know exactly who was behind the attacks due to their highly controlled connections; it 
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would be almost impossible for perpetrators to be in these states and their government not 
be aware of their cyber activities (Clarke and Knake, 2010). We must also take in 
consideration that once a state uses a cyber-weapon, antivirus companies and other 
technology organizations are able to develop attack signature and add it to intrusion 
detection and protection mechanisms to stop it from causing any more damage, rendering 
that cyber-weapon unusable in the future. Thus Russia and China have more to lose than 
to gain from using North Korea as a scapegoat and releasing cyber weapons in their 
arsenal. 
The established links between the attacks and significant events point to North 
Korea as the most likely perpetrator of these cyberattacks.  DPRK military organizations 
are the predominant users of computer systems in North Korea. North Korea has also set 
a pattern of their persistence and ability to leverage different types of cyberattacks against 
South Korea. North Korea can also be found liable due to North Korea’s control of the 
private sector: The attack can be established as state-executed, which Healy (2011) 
described as national government conducting “the attack using cyber forces under their 
direct control” (p. 2). With an international acceptable level of attribution to North Korea, 
North Korea should have to make restitutions per international law and jus post bellum. 
3. Cyberattack Responses 
Even though North Korea is a “rogue state” that ignores international law, South 
Korea could force North Korea to repay them damages through sanctions, and could 
enlist the help of other states to also sanction North Korea. Sanctions are more successful 
when multiple states enforce them against belligerents. South Korea can invoke Article 
39, 41, and 42 of the UN Charter (1945) and present all the collected evidence to the UN 
Security Council to force them to take action against North Korea. Under Article 39, the 
council will evaluate the evidence and determine if “the existence of any threat to the 
peace exits, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and “what measures shall be taken 
in accordance with Article 41 and 42.” South Korea will need to let the UN Security 
Council attempt to settle the dispute without the use of an armed force under Article 41, 
such as by economic sanctions, and only after failure to stop the threat, will the UN 
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Security Council allow South Korea to use military operations to maintain or restore 
peace under Article 42. Sanctions against a state with nothing to lose will probably not 
reach the sanctions’ objective and South Korea will be forced to respond through other 
actions. 
Responding to cyberattacks involves a significant amount of time and resources 
and requires response personnel to have technical knowledge.  Some private 
organizations in South Korea may be unfit to face the attacks and end up bankrupt. 
Therefore, South Korea can also formally bring matters against North Korea through the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), as they are also responsible for protecting states and 
enforcing customary international law (ICJ, 2015). The ICJ can then review the evidence, 
conduct investigations, and issue their ruling, which North Korea, as a signatory of the 
UN Charter, is mandated to abide by (ICJ, 2015). Even a single attack can be sufficiently 
damaging that the perpetrators should be held accountable and pay the monetary 
damages. That is, the ICJ can enforce tort law, which stipulates that if an aggressor 
conducts an intentional act to cause harm, the victim can pursue a lawsuit to obtain 
compensation; cyberspace torts are classified as intentional torts (Grama, 2010). North 
Korea has intentionally harmed private entities through cyberspace therefore; they should 
compensate South Korea for the damages they have incurred. The more state –on-state 
cyberattacks become prevalent, the more the UN and ICJ will need to set precedents to 
prosecute states that do not act within international laws. 
South Korea can try to coerce North Korea to stop attacking them by launching a 
counterattack. South Korea should try to show North Korea that they not only have the 
knowledge of the intricacies of their intranet, but they can also cause them some serious 
damage if they choose to, since air-gapped system do not get updated often and have 
persistent vulnerabilities. Libicki (2013) argues that the brittleness of enemy systems can 
be demonstrated by the ability to hack into enemy systems at any time. A show of force 
may help coerce North Korea to sign agreements promising compensation and to cease 
any future cyberattacks against South Korea. 
Can South Korea abide by the basic principles of the law of armed combat in a 
cyber response to North Korea? The basic principles of LOAC are distinction, 
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proportionality, military necessity, and humanity (Carr, 2011). Only a few top-level 
government officials in North Korea have access to the Internet (Ventre, 2011;Sang-ho, 
2014a). Moreover, “only a fraction of the 25 million citizens are allowed to use tightly 
controlled intranets” (Sang-ho, 2014a). Consequently, targeted cyberattacks on North 
Korean computer systems will be a direct attack on their military and government 
systems, which will abide by the principle of distinction of only targeting combatants. 
The attack will also meet the proportionality criteria, as the attack should not exceed the 
use of force to achieve the results sought. This attack will also meet the military necessity 
criteria, as the cyberattack will seek to only “weaken the military forces of the enemy” 
(ICRC, 2002, p. 7). Additionally, such attacks can be consistent with the humanity 
principle because they can avoid unnecessary suffering and injuries with a reversible 
cyberattack.  
F. CONCLUSION 
The DPRK and the ROK are still at war so cyberattacks conducted by North 
Korea need to abide by LOAC. As Schmitt (2013) stated about the Georgia 2008 
cyberattacks, any cyberattacks that are part of hostilities should be governed by LOAC. 
North Korea has demonstrated their inability or unwillingness to abide by the principles 
of international law and continue violating South Korea’s sovereignty by crossing into 
their borders, making civilian organizations and infrastructure primary targets, incurring 
significant collateral damage, and incurring damaging economic effects. It is also clear 
that DPRK Government organizations conducted the attacks, which means the North 
Korean government should be held accountable for these actions.  
South Korea does have the technical expertise to deal with these major 
cyberattacks, but it has cost them millions of dollars to respond and clean up after them. 
We should be concerned about states that lack the capability or capital to respond to 
cyberattacks of this scale. Additionally, since the level of sophistication for cyberattacks 
will continue to increase, as McAfee labs determined from the 2009 to 2011 against 
South Korea, the fact that we have not seen a lethal cyberattack does not mean that it is 
impossible. 
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 Since we know North Korea has repeatedly attacked South Korea, the UN, 
through the ICJ, can subpoena packet information between these two states to facilitate 
accountability after a cyberattack, and those third-party states that refuse to cooperate can 
be “suspected of being involved in the attack” (Rowe, 2015). The UN will need 
international cooperation to obtain information from the different traversed routers. The 
level of attribution should be sufficient for the UN, the ICJ, and other states to 
collectively respond. Nonetheless, various factors shape UN actions in the Korean 
Peninsula and limit their ability to respond to the cyberattacks perpetrated by North 
Korea, such as the tasks of controlling problems that could easily escalate or deteriorate. 
Some examples of these problems are the possibility of war in the Korean Peninsula, 
maintaining peace talks, handling North Korea’s established military objective to reunite 
the Koreas, and addressing North Korea’s inability to feed their citizens without 
international aid (Worden, 2008). There are also complex relationships between the 
DPRK, the ROK, and the United States because of mistrust. This complicates response 
actions, such as South Korea and the United States not conducting annual exercises or 
promising aid in response to North Korea’s assurance to stop nuclear weapon 
proliferation and missiles exports, although North Korea has not abided with such 
agreements (Worden, 2008). However, previous attacks showed that if state-sponsored 
attacks continued to go unpunished, civilian organizations will continue to be targeted. 
The SPE hack was an example because the FBI not only publicly attributed the 
cyberattack to a state, but the United States also issued sanctions against North Korea. 
The global community needs more cases like this to hold belligerents accountable either 
through sanctions or tort law.  
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CYBER-WARFARE JUS POST BELLUM FRAMEWORK 
This study argues for a cyber-post-conflict framework. Some International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) conventions and treaties certainly apply to cyber-warfare post-
conflict, but they fall short in other areas. For example, the Hague Conventions mandate 
that states provide recovery assistance or restitution for cultural property at the 
conclusion of an armed conflict, and they prohibit the use of neutral powers to conduct 
attacks (ICRC, 2014), so damage to neutral states will need to be repaired post bellum. 
Respecting neutral states is difficult for a cyber-weapon deployment through the Internet, 
as it must traverse many boundaries to reach its target; the best way to respect neutrality 
is to release cyber weapons only against air-gapped systems through removable media or 
interference with supply chains.   
The lack of cyber-warfare specific laws affects jus post bellum because it limits 
states’ ability to seek international aid to prosecute violations and mandate compensation. 
Guns for hire in cyberspace are not currently covered by international law. Conventions 
for Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) prohibit indiscriminate and excessive effects 
(ICRC, 2014), so conventions for cyber weapons can be established that outline specific 
limitations and prohibitions. The IHL conventions were written in the late 1800’s and 
early 1900’s (ICRC, 2014), so the wording poorly applies to cyberspace operations. Even 
the additions of the various conventions in 1977 do not sufficiently cover cyberspace 
since no one foresaw that the Internet would become central to both civilian and military 
operations. Nonetheless, we can propose the following framework to address cyber post-
conflict. 
1. Outlaw Unethical Cyber Weapons  
The first step is to discourage proliferation of unethical cyber weapons by holding 
states accountable post bellum when jus in bello violations occur. Ethical weapons 
include weapons that their only intent is to meet their objective and then self-destruct, 
precise cyber weapons, cyber weapons that will have less collateral damage than a kinetic 
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attack (Denning and Strawser, 2014), and reversible attacks (Rowe, 2010). Giesen 
(2013), Rowe et al. (2011), Denning and Strawser (2014), and Liaropolous (2010) agree 
that unethical cyber weapons should not be used to obtain military objectives. A new 
convention, such as those for CCWs, can satisfy this.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross should be the lead for establishing 
such cyber weapons conventions since they are overseers of IHL (ICRC, 2002). The 
convention would ban any weapon in violation of current established laws and will 
include new stipulations and punishment for indiscriminate weapons or state sponsored 
cyberattacks strictly targeting civilians, as well as address the shortfalls of current 
international laws in cyberspace. The new convention for cyber-weapon development and 
proliferation would seek to stop the use of immoral cyber weapons and encourage only 
the development of ethical cyber weapons, with the understanding that there might be 
occasions where the use of a cyber-weapon will be more ethical.  
It will not be an easy task, but the onus falls on the cyber warriors that will need 
to avoid development of indiscriminate cyber weapons and follow operations planning 
and targeting process to vet and validate legal targets, methods of attack, and conduct 
proper battle damage assessment to avoid overkill. Cyber operators must be able to 
determine if the deployed weapon will meet the desired effects and determine cascading 
effects to inform the decision makers of the consequences of deploying a cyber-weapon. 
Iasiello (2004) advocates for safeguarding the innocent; a convention for cyber weapons 
will help protect the innocent and avoid unnecessary suffering due to deployment of 
cyber weapons.  
2. Add Critical Cyber Infrastructure to the Protected Sites 
Cyber weapons can target anything in cyberspace. Because of the dual use and 
interconnectedness of civilian and military cyber-infrastructure, critical cyber 
infrastructure should be added to the protected sites to protect civilians from the ravages 
of war and keep states accountable for their actions in cyberspace.  
Article 50 and 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
(1977) try to afford more protection to civilians and civilian infrastructure. Article 50 and 
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57 prohibit attacks that may cause “damage to civilian objects” and article 56 protects 
sites against attacks that may have serious consequences for civilians. However, these 
articles do not correctly address cyberspace because Article 56 is meant for infrastructure 
that would expel dangerous forces and, as Jakobson (2011) states, some cyberattacks may 
not have any physical damage. Essentially, these articles are not enough protection for 
critical cyber infrastructure. Therefore, this thesis endorses Geib and Lahmann (2012) in 
recommending establishment of a humanitarian “safe heaven” in cyberspace that would 
include any cyber infrastructure that has significant civilian purpose. They propose that 
states should only target dual-use targets with reversible attacks. There are a variety of 
reversible attacks that can be used, such as those proposed by Rowe (2010) against dual-
use targets. The reversible attacks would avoid wide spread destruction and make 
reconstruction easier for both victor and defeated. The protection of cyber critical 
infrastructure and outlining methods of attack for dual-use systems would ensure cyber 
weapon deployments avoid targeting cyber infrastructure by any means that could cause 
excessive and unnecessary suffering. 
3. International Community Involvement 
There can be many entities involved in post bellum activities and reconstruction, 
since it will be difficult for all but the most powerful states to accomplish all post bellum 
activities from cyber-warfare alone. To successfully assign attribution and recover, there 
need to be international cooperation and aid agreements to facilitate investigations, keep 
states accountable, and provide recovery aid. Ferwerda et al. (2010) noted that there are 
still shortfalls with cooperation and links between the different international cyber-
response units. An international organization solely responsible for dealing with 
international cyberattacks, which can coordinate cooperation, run relief efforts, and set 
priorities will ensure a fast response to cyberattacks and limit human suffering. 
This thesis proposes that such an organization should be under the United Nations 
(UN), as they have the prosecution capability and they are responsible for ensuring peace 
between states (UN, 1945). The International Telecommunications Union currently 
provides a link between the UN and other cyber organizations (Ferweda et al., 2010), but 
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it does not currently provide cyberattack recovery aid. The UN has precedents in creating 
organizations that protect humanity where no other boundaries exist such as the World 
Meteorological Organization, a specialized agency of 191 members that handles 
international cooperation for meteorological information (WMO, 2015). 
A cyberwar-focused organization can be the lead for establishing cooperation 
agreements, leveraging existing international organizations, setting response actions, and 
sharing information. Information sharing could expedite antivirus responses to protect 
vulnerable systems. International cooperation will also ensure that lessons learned from 
each incident are tracked and not repeated, such as Iasiello’s (2004) lessons learned 
recommendation. Additionally, a collective effort by an international organization can 
help a population recover post-conflict, as evidenced by the many organizations that were 
involved during the Kosovo and Iraq Wars. Having a single international organization 
will ensure that plans and priorities are set to avoid repetitive efforts, such as were 
encountered in Kosovo (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2009). Reconstruction includes many 
activities. States lacking technical knowledge will require even more aid for recovery and 
investigations. For example, Casey (2011) describes a system administrator that 
mistakenly overwrote some files during forensic analysis.  
4. Accountability 
Cyberattacks that frequently go unpunished would encourage more cyber actors to 
attacks without regard to established laws. Schmitt (2013) agrees that “a state bears 
international legal responsibility” for any attributable cyber action in violation of 
international rules (p. 29). Therefore, this thesis recommends a three-prong approach to 
enforcing accountability in cyberspace: punishment, restoration actions, and 
proportionality.  
a. Punishment 
Punishment would require attribution, which international cooperation agreements 
could facilitate. Orend (2007), Iasiello (2004), and Boon (2005) advocate for ensuring 
states are accountable for their actions during war. In the same way, the international 
community should hold states accountable for violating international laws in cyberspace. 
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Punishment can include monetary compensation and prosecution, which can be 
facilitated by the UN, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal 
Court. Punishments will begin deterring other cyber actors. Making states accountable for 
their actions in cyberspace would serve as a deterrent to reckless cyberattacks and would 
encourage ethical cyber weapons. Examples of punishment for deterrence are the five 
Chinese officers that have been charged for targeting American civilian organizations 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 2014) and the sanctions against North Korea because for the 
Sony Entertainment Pictures hack (FoxNews.com, 2015). 
b. Restoration of Affected System and Infrastructure 
Orend (2007), Bass (2004), and Iasiello (2004) advocate for international 
reconstruction efforts. Bass specifically addresses restoring the economy and 
infrastructure. Orend recommends economic restitution on top of reconstruction aid, and 
Iasiello recommends a combined reconstruction effort by the victor and the defeated. 
Bass stipulates that victors should depart immediately unless a victim state does not have 
the technical means to recover. All these stipulations should also apply in cyberspace. 
The international community should ensure the responsible states provide support to the 
victims of their cyber weapon deployments. Nonetheless, lack of attribution does not 
clear the international community from collectively helping a state recover from a 
cyberattack.  
c. Proportionality 
Orend (2007) tries to define fair peace settlements and Kant (2006) stipulates that 
peace agreements with ulterior motives would result in more hostilities. Boon (2005) 
advocates for having the ability to assess the level of intervention that is required. 
Therefore, proportionality in peace agreements will be important to ensure that the 
responses that both victor and defeated must undertake to resolve the conflict are fair, or 
otherwise the settlement will only be postponing an inevitable war. Proportionality also 
means that states and the international community involvement should not be excessive 
to the required need of the state to recover.    
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5. Plans 
Post bellum plans should be considered before a cyber-weapon is deployed. Not 
having a post-bellum plan can lead to problems as the 2003 Iraq War demonstrated 
(McCready, 2009). Orend, Iasiello, and McCready advocate having post-bellum plans 
before the conflict concludes. This is especially important given the uncertainty of 
cyberattacks. Planning should include contingency operations, such as actions for cyber 
weapons that had unexpected and excessive collateral damage. 
Each part of this framework mutually supports each other. We cannot hold states 
accountable for their action in cyberspace if there are no laws prohibiting those actions. 
The international community can then enforce accountability or discourage states from 
building unethical cyber weapons through punishments and mandating compensation. 
Additionally, an international organization will have to oversee compliance or states will 
not abide by the new established laws. 
B. CYBERATTACK RESPONSE 
A standard set of procedures would aid states to follow the same steps to resolve 
cyber post-conflict. The new UN cyber organization can establish such standards and 
procedures. Steps that can be used when responding to a cyberattack are shown in Figure 
10 including steps to ensure attribution and accountability. As Casey (2011) points out, 
evidence must be properly handled and tracked, if charges are to stand up in an 
international court.  
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Figure 10.  Cyberattack Response Flowchart. 
1. Step 1: Information Gathering 
Gather initial information and conduct initial damage assessment: The affected 
organization would gather pertinent attack information such as the attack type, the 
possible target, how long the attack has been going on, affected systems, and the impact 
of the attack. Organizations lacking technical knowledge can reach the national and 
regional cyber response centers to aid them in conducting this step. 
2. Step 2: Cyberwar 
Establish whether the activity is cyberwar or not: This affects response actions. 
Even if the attack is not considered an act of war, the victim can still seek international 
aid. Categorizing the attack can determine if just-war theory is applicable. The attack can 
be categorized as unintentional, criminal, or a cyber act of war. If it was an unintentional 
incident, the state can begin the recovery phase immediately. If it was a criminal attack, 
then the state can attempt to identify the criminals and bring them to justice through 
either national or international cyber crime laws.  
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3. Step 3: International Notification 
If the attack is an act of war, then the state should notify the international 
community and determine a response action. If the attack was not an act of war, it can be 
categorized as a criminal act, and the victim and state cyber organizations can conduct an 
investigation to establish attribution to a state, organization, or individual, and determine 
response actions. National and regional cyber centers can aid during investigations and 
during the recovery if the victim does not have cyber insurance or lacks technical 
knowledge.  
4. Step 4: Formal Investigation 
The new UN cyber organization could oversee or assist with a formal 
investigation. The international community and victim organizations can conduct the 
investigation ensuring proper procedures and chains of custody to ensure investigation 
outcomes are legitimate. If the victim state does not possess technical knowledge, the 
international organizations can support investigations and damage assessments. During 
the formal investigation, a damage assessment that includes direct, indirect, and any other 
type of effect should be conducted. The outcome of the investigation should specify some 
level of attribution.  
5. Step 5: Attribution 
Attribution can be established to a state, individual, or organization through 
technical steps and significant political, historical, or other events. Finding out if the 
attack was state-sponsored can be difficult as governments can use botnets, criminal 
entities, patriot hackers, or other cyber actors to invoke plausible deniability. But states 
that want a political effect, like North Korea, or Russia against Georgia in 2008, are not 
good at concealing the origins of their attacks. The victim state can seek international aid, 
such as from the UN and Computer Emergency Response Teams, to conduct the formal 
investigations. This would be especially beneficial for those states without the technical 
ability to conduct an investigation. The UN can then facilitate the investigation through 
international agreements, sanctions, and subpoenas to attempt to determine the aggressor 
 82 
and seek justice by holding the responsible individual or state accountable for their 
actions.  
The attribution must be credible to the international community and be provable 
in court without revealing secrets. States can still establish a certain level of attribution 
without having to reveal how the attribution was made. Attribution does not have to be 
definite to be valid. For example, if the attack is traced to an organization within a state 
and the state refuses to investigate that organization because the attack was conducted on 
their behalf, then the state should be considered responsible for aiding and abetting 
aggressors. 
6. Step 6: Cyberattack Response 
If attribution was established, responses can be in the form of prosecution, 
mandated compensation, and or sanctions. The punishment must fit the crime and 
appropriate punishment should set precedents for deterring other cyber actors. 
7. Step 7: Recovery 
It could take a victim months to recover from a significant cyberattack (Cichonski 
et al, 2012). Therefore, this step has multiple sub-steps as it entails various actions to 
resolve a cyberattack and it can be resource-intensive. The victim and international 
community can conduct recovery. One of the questions for the international community 
is to assess if the attacked state has the technological capabilities and knowledge to 
resolve cyberattacks. Some states do not possess the necessary technical knowledge to 
restore systems, and would need more outside help to return systems to normal and 
ensure the attack has been contained. In some cases such as encryption attacks, the cyber-
aggressor may need to supply key information about the attack to save time. The UN 
cyber organization can also coordinate agreements between the victim and belligerent to 
ensure conflict resolution.   
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a. Cost Assessment 
The state should find out as much information about the attack as possible to help 
them determine cost, such as making a list of affected systems, what information was 
taken and or deleted, what are the consequences of the lost information, and whether the 
systems have backups available. Some organizations have developed checklists to help 
targeted organizations determine cyberattack cost, such as Booz Allen Hamilton 
Incorporated (2014), Ponemon Institute (2013), and National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (Cichonski et al., 2012). These checklists can aid organizations enumerate 
damages and collect all pertinent information after a cyberattack. Checklists are helpful 
because assessing the damage of a cyberattack can encompass many elements and take 
time. Figure 11 gives an example. It includes direct, indirect, and other associated costs, 
which can be zero for costs that do not apply, such as for systems that do not contain any 
intellectual property.  
Different factors can affect the cost of each section. For instance, the restoring of 
data can be affected by the volume of the data and connection and processor speeds. 
Appendix B shows a hypothetical filled-out checklist for a small organization and 
suggests how an organization can put out of business by one single costly cyberattack. 
The checklist in Figure 11 also suggests the significant actions that organizations must 
take to respond to attacks and assess the damage. This shows the difficulty a military 




Figure 11.  Cyberattack Cost Checklist  
(after Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., 2014; and PI, 2013). 
b. Vulnerabilities Elimination 
The victim would have to determine the type of attack and vector used to 
determine and eliminate the exploited vulnerabilities from their systems. Examples of 
vectors are an advanced persistent threat or malware through a zero-day vulnerability, 
removable media, malicious insider, or social engineering. The victim would have to scan 
all networks to identify affected systems and determine if the cyberattack has been 
contained or if it is still spreading. After the victim finds the vulnerability, the victim will 
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have to develop a fix or replacement code to cure the affected systems. This may include 
disabling compromised accounts, patching, changing firewall rules, and changing 
passwords (Cichonski et al., 2012).   
c. Anti-malware Signatures 
The victim will then have to create antivirus signatures to prevent any other 
systems from being affected by the same cyberattack. These will most likely be created 
by vendors and added to their vulnerability signature list. The antivirus vendors can then 
distribute the signature to other organizations to ensure other systems are protected from 
future damage because of that particular attack. International cooperation can help protect 
global system against similar attacks.  
d. Restoration 
Backups of software and data are important for cyberattack responses because the 
easiest recovery involves restoring damaged software and data from backups. Restoration 
would be impossible if backups are not available, damaged, or not conducted correctly. 
Otherwise, software may be recovered from vendors or may have to be completely rebuilt 
(Cichonski et al., 2012). These recovery actions take time and resources.   
e. Incident Response Planning 
Since computer systems are going to be susceptible to cyberattacks and states 
heavily rely on computer networks, government and at-risk organizations must have a 
recovery plan that includes data backup to facilitate restoration. Organizations that have 
detailed incident-response plans, such as tested backup files and response steps for 
different types of incidents, will do better under attack (Cichonski et al., 2012).  Potential 
victims should also be concerned with making changes to prevent future attacks by either 
policy or infrastructure (Cichonski et al., 2012). The victim should review the incident 
response plans to find out what went wrong and prevent future attacks. If those plans do 
not already exist, the victim should seek to develop incident response plans that will 
enable fast incident handling.  
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f. Education  
Education can help prevent future cyberattacks. International, regional, and 
















































International treaties and conventions do not sufficiently cover jus post bellum 
actions and various specialists recommended an addition of a third pillar to just war 
theory to properly address post-conflict activities (Stanh, 2008; Douglas, 2003; Orend, 
2007; Iasiello, 2004; Österdahl 2012). Douglas argues that the lack of attention to jus post 
bellum can result in more hostilities, which was certainly the case during the Iraq War 
recovery period (McCready, 2009). It has been difficult to conduct post bellum actions 
during kinetic wars and now that we face a new warfighting domain in cyberspace, it will 
be even more difficult to apply international laws to cyber post-conflict situations. This 
study found that current International Humanitarian Law and international treaties and 
conventions do not sufficiently cover post-bellum issues. Analysis has been done on 
international law before and during a cyber conflict (Schmitt, 2013; Dörmann, 2001; 
Koh, 2012), as well as the effects of deployed cyberattacks against various states (Kaska 
et al., 2010). However, in the aftermath of a deployed cyber weapon; there is no formal 
mechanism for the assignment of accountability for the restoration of affected 
infrastructure and recovery from damages. 
The increased cyberattacks against civilian organizations highlights the need for 
international agreements focused on cyber jus post bellum since civilians will share a 
disproportionate collateral damage from cyber warfare. Cyber-weapon deployment can 
have detrimental economic, physical, and psychological effects and extensive collateral 
damage. In addition, cyber-weapon effects are difficult to predict and they limit the 
ability to conduct damage assessment compared to conventional attacks, preventing the 
ability to assess their success rate. Another major problem in cyberspace is attribution, 
which affects accountability and response actions. Therefore, establishing attribution to 
assign accountability is essential in dealing with the aftermath of cyberattack. Attribution 
is not impossible, as significant events and forensic actions can establish some level of 
attribution that would be acceptable for international action. Attribution has been 
demonstrated by the United States charging the five Chinese officers (U.S. Department of 
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Justice, 2014) and issuing sanctions against North Korea in response for the Sony 
Pictures Entertainment hack (FoxNews.com, 2015), whether North Korea accepted 
culpability or not.  
Jus post bellum is still important even when we cannot exactly identify the guilty 
party, as various organizations aid suffering states during post-conflict by clearing mines 
and providing food (Schmickle & Writer, 2003) even when they were not part of the 
conflict. For instance, there has been a collective effort to clear landmines around the 
world because they continue to claim innocent victims and prevent reconstruction efforts 
(U.S. Department of State, 1994). Just as there was a collective response for the 2003 
Iraq and 1998 Kosovo Wars recovery, there also needs to be a collective cyber response 
after a cyberattack. These two wars showed various states and organizations involved in 
the recovery process and taking part in different actions to stabilize the state. Helping a 
state recover after a cyberattack can provide added benefits, such as gaining the trust of 
the victim’s public and providing the supporting agency with first-hand attack insight 
which could enable discovering new vulnerabilities thereby protecting other systems 
against similar attack, which ultimately aids the global community. There are already 
established international organizations to aid with recovery after cyber conflict. However, 
to avoid the issues faced during the Kosovo and Iraq Wars, there needs to be a lead 
agency that has a recovery plan, aids in conducting proper assessments, coordinates 
recovery efforts, avoids duplicate actions, and establishes priorities. 
Cyberattacks are not going away. There are similarities between kinetic and 
cyberwars, but there are also many differences. Additionally, international treaties and 
conventions were written to deal with conventional wars. Nonetheless, ideas introduced 
by theologists, scholars, ethicists, and specialists can be used to recommend to the 
international community ways to expand current international agreements or create new 
international agreements to prohibit unethical cyber weapons, safeguard cyber critical 
infrastructure, and establish proper behavior during the aftermath of cyber-weapon 
deployments. 
There are already examples of international cooperation and international 
organizations that can facilitate the expansion or creation of new treaties and global 
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organizations, such as the World Meteorological Organization, the International 
Telecommunication Union, and the Council of Europe Cybercrime Treaty. The lack of a 
global cyber emergency response center poses a problem. There should be a United 
Nations (UN) institution or another type of impartial third party global institution that 
oversees cyberspace, since “there is a marked absence of integrated global institutional 
mechanisms designed to track, record and respond to cyber incidents” (Ferwerda et al., 
2010, p. 2). Investigations can then be facilitated by the new established body, so that 
belligerents cannot pretend the accusations are just fabrications from the attacked state. 
Additionally, attackers must not only be held accountable, but should also have the moral 
and ethical obligation to ensure restitutions are made. If states continue to conduct cyber-
warfare freely without any consequences, more and more states may want to join in. 
Therefore, this study recommends international conventions for cyber post-conflict 
headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as the establishment of a 
UN cyber organization that supervises state actions through cyberspace, ensures 
accountability, and sets procedures for dealing with the aftermath of a cyberattack. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
This study highlighted the difficulty of conducting damage assessments, 
especially for cyber military operations. Cyber battle damage assessments (BDA) 
methods, both technical and procedural, need to be made more specific. The Joint 
Targeting publication outlines BDA, but it does not specifically address cyber BDA 
(DOD, 2013), which leaves cyber warriors and decision makers with the difficult task of 
figuring how to correctly conduct BDA. 
This study recommends the establishment of a UN cyber organization that would 
be responsible for setting polices and procedure for cyberspace, encouraging cooperation, 
and ensuring accountability. A study on the organization’s structure would be helpful for 
the international community and can facilitate cooperation between the already 
established cyber organizations.   
 91 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 92 
APPENDIX A. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
This table contains a list of current international treaties (ICRC, 2014), which lists 
current international treaties including the date, number of state parties and signatories, 
main purpose, and the possible applicability to jus post bellum.  The number under State 
Signatories column signifies the number of states that have accepted the treaty but have 







Purpose Jus Post Bellum 
Applicability
Hague Convention (II) on the 
Laws and Customs of War on 
Land
29-Jul-1899 50 0
Provisions defining and governing the 
usages of war on land, general rules 




Declaration (IV,2) concerning 
Asphyxiating Gases
29-Jul-1899 32 0
Prohibiting the use of projectiles the 
sole object of which is the diffusion 




Hague Declaration (IV,3) 
concerning Expanding Bullets 29-Jul-1899 32 0
Prohibiting the use of bullets which 
expand or flatten easily in the human 
body, such as bullets with a hard 
envelope which does not entirely 





Hague Convention on Hospital 
Ships 21-Dec-1904 30 1
Exemption of Hospital Ships, in Time 
of War, from payment of all dues and 
taxes imposed on vessels
Not applicable
Hague Convention (III) on the 
Opening of Hostilities 18-Oct-1907 35 17
Hostilities must not commence 
without previous and explicit 
warning, in the form either of a 
declaration of war, giving reasons, or 
of an ultimatum with conditional 
declaration of war
Not applicable
Hague Convention (IV) on War 
on Land and its Annexed 
Regulations
18-Oct-1907 37 15
Revision of the First Hague Peace 
Conference of 1899 (1899 convention 
remains in effect for those who 





Hague Convention (V) on 
Neutral Powers in case of War 
on Land
18-Oct-1907 33 17
Rights and duties of neutral Powers 
in case of war on land and regulating 
the position of the belligerents who 
have taken refuge in neutral territory
The territory of 
neutral Powers is 
inviolable.
Hague Convention (VI) on Enemy 
Merchant Ships 18-Oct-1907 30 19
Merchant ships in enemy ports or 
high seas should detained or 
confiscated
Not applicable
Hague Convention (VII) on 
Conversion of Merchant Ships
18-Oct-1907 33 16
Provision of incorporating merchant 








Purpose Jus Post Bellum 
Applicability
Hague Convention (VII) on 
Conversion of Merchant Ships
18-Oct-1907 33 16
Provision of incorporating merchant 
ships to fighting fleet in times of war
Not applicable
Hague Convention (VIII) on 
Submarine Mines
18-Oct-1907 28 17
Restrict and regulate employment of 
automatic submarine contact mines 
to intercept commercial shipping
Not applicable
Hague Convention (IX) on 
Bombardment by Naval Forces
18-Oct-1907 36 16
Prohibits bombardment of 
undefended ports, towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings by naval 
forces, except for military objectives
Not applicable
Hague Convention (XI) on 
Restrictions of the Right of 
Capture
18-Oct-1907 32 17
Restrictions on exercising the right of 
capture in naval war
Not applicable
Convention (XIII) concerning the 
Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers in Naval War
18-Oct-1907 29 18
Rights and duties of neutral Powers 
in case of Naval war on land
Not applicable
Hague Declaration (XIV) on 
Explosives from Balloons
18-Oct-1907 20 13
Prohibits the discharge of projectiles 
and explosives from balloons or by 
other new methods of a similar 
nature
Not applicable
Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating 
or Poisonous Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods
17-Jun-1925 137 0
Prohibits the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
Not applicable
Havana Convention on Maritime 
Neutrality
20-Feb-1928 8 13
Provisions for the protection of 
merchant ships and the duties and 
rights of belligerents and neutrals in 
maritime
Not applicable
London Treaty on Limitation and 
Reduction of Naval Armaments
22-Apr-1930 11 0
Warships, surface or submarine, may 
not sink or render incapable of 
navigation a merchant vessel without 
having first placed passengers, crew 
and ship's papers in a place of safety
Not applicable
Roerich Pact for the Protection 
of Artistic and Scientific 
Institutions
15-Apr-1935 10 11
Protection of historic monuments, 
museums, scientific, artistic, 
educational and cultural institutions
Not applicable
Procès-verbal on Submarine 
Warfare of the Treaty of London 6-Nov-1936 40 11
Warships, surface or submarine, may 
not sink or render incapable of 
navigation a merchant vessel without 
having first placed passengers, crew 
and ship's papers in a place of safety
Not applicable
Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal
8-Aug-1945 20 4
Prosecution and punishment of the 
major war criminals of the European 
Axis and Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal
War crimes
Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide
9-Dec-1948 146 1
Establishes genocide, in peace and 
war, as a crime under international 
law
Prohibit and punish 
genocide
Final Act of the Diplomatic 
Conference of Geneva











Purpose Jus Post Bellum 
Applicability
Geneva Convention (I) on 
Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field
12-Aug-1949 196 0
Protection of the wounded, sick, 
medical units, medical personnel, 
chaplains,  voluntary aid, and medical 
material and locations. Prohibits 
impersonation of protected persons 
or locations.
War crimes
Geneva Convention (II) on the 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
of Armed Forces at Sea
12-Aug-1949 196 0
Protection of the wounded, sick, 
shipwreck, hospital ships, and 
medical and religious personnel of 
hospital ships. Prohibits 
impersonation of protected persons 
or locations.
War crimes
Geneva Convention (III) on 
Prisoners of War 12-Aug-1949 196 0
Provisions on the treatment of 







Geneva Convention (IV) on 
Civilians 12-Aug-1949 196 0
Supplementary rules for the 
protection of civilians in time of war. 
provisions on the treatment and 
protection of civilians not taking part 
in hostilities
War crimes
Final Act on the Protection of 
Cultural Property 14-May-1954 0 46
Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict
Not applicable
Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property
14-May-1954 126 4
Safeguarding and respect for cultural 
property, irrespective of origin or 
ownership
Not applicable
Hague Protocol for the 
Protection of Cultural Property 14-May-1954 103 1
Prevent the exportation of cultural 
property and to provide for the 





Convention Statutory Limitations 
to War Crimes
26-Nov-1968 55 0
Established no statutory limitation for 
war crimes and crimes against 
humanity
Extradition and 
punishment of war 
crimes
Convention on the Prohibition of 
Biological Weapons
10-Apr-1972 170 10
Prohibits the development, 
production and stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and calls for their 
destruction.
Not applicable
European Convention on Non-
Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes
25-Jan-1974 3 1
Limits applicability to cases for which 
the statutory limitation period has not 
expired and the prosecution of 







Prohibits engagement in military or 
any other hostile use of 
environmental modification 
techniques having widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects as the 















Purpose Jus Post Bellum 
Applicability
Final Act of the Diplomatic 
Geneva Conference 10-Jun-1977 0 101
Study the two drafts for additional 
protocols to the four Geneva 
Conventions
Not applicable
Additional Protocol (I) (API) to 
the Geneva Conventions 8-Jun-1977 174 3
Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts
War crimes
Annex (I) API (amended in 1993) 30-Nov-1993
Facilitate the identification of 
personnel, material, units, transports 
and installations protected under the 
Geneva Conventions and the Protocol
Not applicable
Annex (I) API 6-Jun-1977
Regulations Concerning Identification Not applicable
Annex (II) API 8-Jun-1977
Identity card for journalists on 
dangerous professional missions
Not applicable
Additional Protocol (II) to the 
Geneva Conventions 8-Jun-1977 167 3
Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts
War crimes
OAU Convention on Mercenaries 3-Jul-1977 30 15 Provisions to eliminate mercenarism Prosecution and 
extradition
Convention prohibiting Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW)
10-Oct-1980 120 5
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May be Deemed to 
be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects
war crimes
CCW Protocol (I) on Non-
Detectable Fragments
10-Oct-1980 115 0
Prohibits the use of any weapon 
which the primary effect is to injure 
by fragments which in the human 
body escape detection by X-rays
War crimes
CCW Protocol (II) prohibiting 
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices
10-Oct-1980 94 0
Restrictions on the use of mines, 





placed in position 
during the conflict
CCW Protocol (III) prohibiting 
Incendiary Weapons
10-Oct-1980 111 0
Pestrictions on the usage of 
incendiary weapons
War crimes
Convention on Mercenaries 4-Dec-1989 33 10
International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries
Prosecution
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 20-Nov-1989 194 2
Protection for children, fundamental 
rights of the child, whether civil, 














Purpose Jus Post Bellum 
Applicability
Convention prohibiting Chemical 
Weapons
13-Jan-1993 190 2
prohibits the development, 
production, stockpiling and use of 
chemical weapons and requires the 
destruction of both chemical 
weapons production facilities and the 
weapons themselves
Not applicable
CCW Protocol (IV) on Blinding 
Laser Weapons
13-Oct-1995 104 0
Prohibits the usage of laser weapons  
design to cause permanent blindness 
to unenhanced vision, that is to the 
naked eye or to the eye with 
corrective eyesight devices
War crimes
CCW Protocol (II) prohibiting 
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other 
Devices, amended, 1996
3-May-1996 102 0
Restrictions on the use, of mines, 
booby-traps and other devices
Clear, remove, 
destroy or maintain 
mines, booby-
traps, and other 
devices as 
specified in Article 
10 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention 18-Sep-1997 162 1
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction
Not applicable
Statute of the International 
Criminal Court
17-Jul-1998 123 31
Establishment of ICC and giving it the 
power to exercise its jurisdiction over 
persons for the most serious crimes 
of international concern, as referred 
to in this Statute, and shall be 
complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions
Prosecution
Second Hague Protocol for the 
Protection of Cultural Property 26-Mar-1999 67 11
Cultural property of the greatest 
importance for humanity can be 
placed under enhanced 
protection provided it is adequately 
protected by domestic law and not 
used for military purposes or to shield 
military sites
Provide financial or 
other assistance 
for immediate 
recovery after the 
end of hostilities
Optional Protocol on the 
involvement of children in armed 
conflict
25-May-2000 159 14
Raise the minimum age for 
participation in hostilities and for 
recruitment to 18 years
Prosecution
Convention prohibiting Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW ), 
amended Article 1
21-Dec-2001 81 0
Prohibit or restrict the use of certain 
weapons which may be deemed to be 












Purpose Jus Post Bellum 
Applicability
CCW Protocol (V) on Explosive 
Remnants of War 28-Nov-2003 87 0
Minimize the risks and effects of 
explosive remnants of war
Post conflict:  mark 
and clear, remove 
or destroy 
explosive remnants 
of war in affected 
territories
Additional Protocol (III) to the 
Geneva Conventions
8-Dec-2005 68 27
Added additional protection emblem 
to red cross, red crescent, and red 
lion and sun
Perfidy
Convention on Cluster Munitions 30-May-2008 89 27
Prohibits the use, development, 
production, stockpiling, retaining, or 
transferring cluster munitions (does 
not include mines)
Not applicable
Arms Trade Treaty 2-Apr-2013 61 69
Regulation of the international trade 
in conventional arms
Not applicable
Note: Number under State Signatories column signifies the number of states that have accepted the treaty, but have not ratified the 
treaty.
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APPENDIX B. CYBERATTACK CHECKLIST EXAMPLE 
This checklist shows the total cost to respond to a cyberattack for a small 
manufacturing organization of 200 members.  The cyberattack cost checklist was derived 
from Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. (2014) and Ponemon Institute (2013), and can help 
organizations determine the total cost of a cyberattack separated by direct, indirect, and 
other associated costs.  It would help an organization determine the cost of the employees 
involved in responding to the attack, and has a list of the tasks to be conducted.  The 
checklist can also help enumerate any permanent damage to either data or systems.  In 
this example, one server and 20 computers could not be recovered, and therefore the cost 
includes replacing, setting up, and restoring data to those computers.  The organization 
may also have to enlist a third-party organization to aid with the investigation and 
recovery.  Customer service would probably have to spend time notifying and answering 
inquiries about the attack.  Additionally, the cost for an average data breach continues to 
increase, according to a report from Ponemon Institute (2014); there was a 201 dollars 
associated cost per compromised record in the United States and most customers did not 
remain with the organization.  Indirect cost can include customers that left the 
organization because of the cyberattack, opportunity cost because of the disruption, and 
intellectual property.  Intellectual property can be somewhat difficult to price, but if the 
organizations main job relies on intellectual property, then it can more appropriately price 
it.  Other costs include legal cost and public relations.   
This malware attack to steal intellectual property lasted 45 days and it cost 1.73 
million dollars.  An organization can benefit from having countermeasures in place to 
offset the cost of a cyberattack such as cybersecurity insurance (HS, 2014).  For example, 
Data Breach Insurance offers a premium of 50 thousand dollars for a manufacturing 
company that will cover up to 10 million dollars (Marciano, 2015).  Additionally, other 
organizations can provide damage assessments and cyber-security services.  
Countermeasures would have cost the organization 60 thousand dollars per year for an 
organization that was worth 5 million dollars.   
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1. Direct Attack  Cost (45 days):  $51,700 
a. Employees Involved (with technical knowledge, 4 employees): 35,500 
i. Salary (75,000/yr): $9,375 
ii. Salary (65,000/yr): $8,125 
iii. 25/hr: $9,000  
iv. 25/hr: $9,000 
b. Tasks to complete 
i. Detection and verification : 
ii. Forensic Analysis:  
iii. Removal of malware: 
iv. Restore systems: 
v. Data restore: 
c. Permanent damage:  $16,200 
i. 1 Server: $2,000 
ii. 20 Computers: $12,000 
iii. Time to set up new equipment: $2,200 
2. Employees involved (third-party organization): $15,000 to aid in forensic analysis 
3. Customer Service: $7,000 
a. Communication: $2,000 
b. Inquiries: $5,000 
4. Credit monitoring cost: $44,000 
a. Personnel Data (200/record): $40,000  
b. Customer Data (200/record):  $4,000 
5. Indirect Cost: $1.6 Millions 
a. Lost Profit ($100,000) 
i. Customers Lost 
ii. Sales Lost 
iii. Productivity Lost 
b. Intellectual Property ($1,500,000) 
i. Cost of Intellectual Property sale 
ii. Used by attacker to compete in market 
6. Legal Cost (legal services or settlements): $10,000 
7. Public Relations Cost: $5,000 
8. Cost of countermeasure tools in which incident could have been avoided ($60,000/yr)  
a. Cyber Insurance ($50,000) 
b. Damage Assessment Cost ($5,000) 
c. Third Party Cyber Security ($5,000) 
Total Cost: 1.73 million dollars  
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